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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, heightened awareness of longstanding biases
against women-in educational, economic, employment, and,
most important, health-related opportunities-has catalyzed an
expanded focus on women's issues. Past inattention to
women's health issues in both the conduct of research and
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clinical practice resulted in serious gaps in knowledge about
the causes, treatment, and prevention of diseases in women. 1

It was over a decade ago that the United States Public
Health Service Task Force on Women's Health Issues concluded
that the exclusion of women in clinical research had significantly affected the quality of health care available to women.2
Knowledge concerning the effects of various treatments on women and their unique needs remains sparse and underdeveloped.3 In addition, the majority of drugs have never been tested on pregnant women, primarily because of fetal protection
policies that prohibit the inclusion of women of childbearing
potential in most drug trials. 4 This knowledge gap has left
women unable to make informed reproductive and health care
decisions. Thus, it has become clear that gender matters and
that health care is no exception.5

1. OFFICE ON WOMEN'S HEALTH, U.S. PuBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FAcr SHEET:
WOMEN'S HEALTH IssuEs {1995) (emphasis added). Women's health often is defmed
as including the normal biological processes, as well as all diseases, disorders, or
conditions that affect women across the life span and that are unique to, more prevalent among, or more serious in women, or for which there are different risk factors
or interventions for women than for men. See generally OFFICE OF REsEARCH ON
WOMEN'S HEALTH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: OPPORTUNITY FOR REsEARCH ON WOMEN'S HEALTH (1991) [hereinafter ORWH REPORT]; Task Force on Women's Health Issues, U.S. Public Health
Service, Women's Health: Report of the Public Health Service Task Force on l'lomen's
Health Issues, 100 PuB. HEALTH REP. 73 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. It is
important to recogni2e that "women" are a large, heterogeneous group-women of
color, women with disabilities, girls, adolescents, postmenopausal women, homeless
women, immigrant women. To incorporate the distinctive and sometimes disparate
needs of all women requires tackling the psychosocial issues that contextunlizs specific medical problems: racism, sexism, violence against women, gender roles, poverty,
and health beliefs. See Task Force Report, supra, at 85 (noting that research and
service programs addressing women's health must address "enduring characteristics
[such] as age, race, or ethnicity as well as . . . marital and household status, urban
or rural living, education, occupation, and income").
2. See Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 82 ("A systematic effort must be
made to address issues relating to gender bias, in research and clinical practice, that
lead to inadequate attention to the needs of women." (emphasis added)).
3. See 1 COMMITTEE ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IssUES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL IssUES OF INCLUDING
WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES 27 (Anna C. Mastroianni et nl. eds, 1994) [hereinafter
WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH]. The two main concerns include the lack of knowledge concerning gender differences in relation to health problems common to both
men and women and lack of investigations of health problems specific to women. See
id.
4. See L. Elizabeth Bowles, The Disenfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The Legal Ramifications of and Solutions for Reclifying the Knowledge
Gap, 45 VAND L. REv. 877, 883 (1992).
5. See generally Karen H. Rothenberg, New Perspeclives for Teaching and
Scholarship: The Role of Gender in Law and Health Care, 54 l\.ID. L. REv. 473, 480
(1995) ("[G]ender does matter in the context of both law and biomedical sciences.").
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Over the last few years, data gathered by women's health
advocates have caught the attention of researchers, policymakers, and the general public. 6 As a result, legislative and regulatory changes have begun to promote the inclusion of women in
clinical research. 7 It is hoped that a better understanding of
women's health issues and gender differences will lead to the
removal of barriers to quality health care for American women.
This Article examines gender bias in health care and the
legal and ethical ramifications of including women in research
and in improving their access to health care. 8 Part II reviews
the pervasiveness of gender bias in health care. It highlights
numerous examples of how gender bias creates barriers to all
levels of women's health, from clinical research to the delivery
of health care services, and explores the reasons for these barriers, including societal attitudes and gender differences in
communication. Part III reviews the historical development of
regulatory policies designed to protect human subjects from
research risks. It argues that federal regulations restricting the
participation of women in clinical trials codified societal distrust
of women's capacity to decide what was best for them, their
fetuses, and families. The evolution toward inclusion is discussed in this historical context as the focus shifts from protecting "vulnerable" women (or their fetuses) from the burdens
of experimentation to increasing the inclusion of women in
clinical trials in order to benefit their health. While new regulations purport to increase inclusion of women, they do not answer the most difficult questions involving pregnant women.
Part IV explores the ethical and legal ramifications of gender bias, primarily in the context of clinical research, as a nonfinancial barrier to health care. More specifically, it explores
the policy underpinnings of the Supreme Court's recognition in

6. See ORWH REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the lack of knowledge
about women's health as "a crisis that has stunned citizens, policymakers, and the
biomedical community"). The report concluded that women will become the larger
population and will find themselves most susceptible to disease in the future. See id.
It also pointed out that some conditions are uniquely female or affect women differ·
ently than men. See id.
7. Refer to Parts II and III infra.
8. This Article is limited to an analysis of gender "bias" as a nonfinancial barrier to health care. Obviously, financial barriers significantly impede women's access
to health care. For example, women are disproportionately employed in temporary or
low-paying service jobs that do not provide health benefits. Of the 35 million uninsured Americans, almost 12 million are adult women between the ages of 18 and 65.
See THE AMERICAN WOMAN: 1994-95, WHERE WE STAND, WOMEN AND HEALTH, 27,
144 (Cynthia Costello & Anne J. Stone eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN WOM·
AN]. There are many more million women that are underinsured, particularly with
respect to access to needed preventive services. See id.
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UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 9 that women can be trusted to
make appropriate decisions concerning their reproductive health
and that differential application of privileges to men and women constitutes gender discrimination.
Part IV then analyzes the constitutional issues, particularly
with respect to the liberty and privacy interests of women,
raised by the regulatory barriers to the participation of women
in clinical research and current paternal consent requirements.
It also considers the equal protection issues raised by
underinclusion and overinclusion of women relative to men in
clinical research.
Part IV continues with an analysis of federal and state
antidiscrimination statutes and their application to both clinical
research and health care access. Finally, it concludes with a
discussion of the tort liability issues raised by the participation
of women in clinical research. Historically, drug manufacturers
and researchers excluded women from their clinical trials, in
part, for fear of liability resulting from harm to potential offspring. In the future, however, liability will likely be based on
the exclusion of women as the standard of care develops to
adapt drugs and treatment to gender differences based on clinical research.
Finally, Part V concludes with a discussion of major policy
considerations that are largely based on the work of the Institute of Medicine's Committee on the Ethical and Legal Issues
Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies. It also
highlights the need to reform our national research agenda,
health professional education, and the representation of women
in science and medicine. Even more basically, it concludes that
we must recognize that gender matters in the way we view
women and their decisionmaking capabilities, in the way patients and providers communicate, and ultimately, in the way
health care is delivered.
II. GENDER BIAS: REALITIES AND REAsONS

[T]he vast majority of women's health concerns . . . are
the same as men's but all too often aren't taken as seriously,
treated as appropriately, or understood as well. 10
9. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). Johnson Controls involved a Title Vll challenge to a
fetal protection policy in the workplace. See id. at 192. For further discussion of its
application to gender bias in clinical research and health care, refer w subpart IV(A)

infra.
10.

LEsLIE LAURENCE & BETH WEINHOUSE, OUTRAGEOUS PRACI'ICES: THE

.ALARMING TRUTH ABOUT HOW MEDICINE :MISTREATS WOMEN 7 (1994).
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Medicine is only as good as the knowledge it's based on,
and the best doctor in the world can't compensate for faulty
research. 11

For the most part, the lack of knowledge about wo,men's
health has resulted from our failure to research women's health
issues. Commentators point to the reinforcement of gender
attitudes and the history of protectionism that have led to current gaps in medical knowledge. 12 Several notions associated
with gender have contributed to the systematic exclusion of
women from clinical research. These factors include the perception of men as the "norm," the idea that hormonal differences
in women will "complicate" research results and increase costs,
the traditional role of women, and the primarily male-dominated research community. 13 For pregnant women, these barriers
are also entangled with potential risks to the fetus and the
associated liability that might follow. 14
Science has a long history of viewing men as the standard
by which all things are measured. "Like the pronoun 'he,' it
was taken for granted that the white male subject stood for all
of us."15 Because the research community views men as the
norm, they see differences in women as unknown variables that
tend to confound results. For example, women present factors
such as menstrual cycles, pregnancy, teratogenic liability, and
menopause. 16 Some researchers argue that these factors complicate research and add excess costs to experimentation. 17
Paradoxically, "scientists seem to be confirming that women's
bodies are different and more difficult to study. But then by
simply extending their male-drawn conclusions to women, they
are implying that-with a few obvious exceptions-women's
bodies are the same as men's. "18 These assumptions have discouraged studies on females and have fostered ignorance concerning the special needs of women. 19

11. Id. at 3.
12. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, 22 HAsTINGS CENTER REP. 24, 24 (1992).
13. See id. at 25-26, 27-28.
14. See id. at 25.
15. Id. at 27.
16. See Bowles, supra note 4, at 881.
17. See Tracy Johnson & Elizabeth Fee, Women's Participation in Clinical Re·
search: From Protectionism to Access, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra
note 3, at 6.
18. LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 4.
19. See id. (noting that instead of seeking solutions to some of the problems
presented with studying women, "scientists have simply taken the easy way out and
studied men").
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The perception of the middle-aged white male as the
normal economic distributor and an emphasis on the economic
costs of health care also may have led to this disproportionate
concern for the health of men. 20 In addition to outnumbering
women in positions of political influence, men also dominate in
the medical research community.21 Although the proportion of
women in medical schools has risen steadily in the last decade
to approximately forty percent,22 women still constitute a minority of medical researchers and a small percentage of those
making funding decisions. 23 Naturally, policymakers and researchers prioritize issues according to their most personal
interests.24 AB a result, women's concerns, as well as the underlying variables of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and
sexual orientation, have not been given the attention they deserve.25 Because men dominate the decisionmaking community,
the social worth judgments of how to allocate funds also favor
research on men. 26
The Public Health Task Force on Women's Health Issues
concluded that many methodological problems, as well as lack
of data, limit the ability to understand the status of women's
health and women's particular health care needs. 27 In study
after study of health issues important to women, women have
been excluded or seriously underrepresented.

~0.
See Dresser, supra note 12, at 28 (maintaining that an emphasis on the
economic costs of disease may lead to disproportionate amounts of research on the
young or middle-aged white male).
21.
See id. (noting that science ~has been and to some extent still is largely
populated by white males").
22.
See AssOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, WOMEN IN U.S. ACADEMIC MEDICINE: STATISTICS 1995, at 1 (1995) (citing a 41% figure).
23. See Bowles, supra note 4, at 883.
24. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 5 (relating a female NIH
doctor's observation that "[y]ou want doctors to study what they're interested in, so
you have male doctors in their fifties studying other male doctors in their fifties for
heart attacks").
25. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 114 (indicating that
a growing body of evidence indicates that these variables have a significant impact
on health and should be examined in clinical studies).
26. Members of the dominant group see themselves as "objectivea and the existing social structure as "natural." Dresser, supra note 12, at 27-28. Accordingly, the
"special money" necessary for studies of women and minorities reflects the social
worth judgment that "regular money" should be reserved for "normala research on
the group with greater socially determined priority, white males. Id. at 28.
27. See Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 81.
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Gender Gaps in Clinical Research

Perhaps the most shocking example of the exclusion of
women from the clinical study of a health condition that almost
exclusively affects women was a project that examined the
impact of obesity on breast and uterine cancer. The study participants were all men. 28 For twenty years, women were also
excluded from the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging, one
of the largest studies of the natural process of aging. 29 Six
years after women were permitted to participate, a report of the
study findings entitled "Normal Human Aging" was published.30 It is considered the definitive study of aging in the
United States. It contains no data on women. 31
Women were also frequently left out of clinical trials of
experimental AIDS therapies, 32 yet women now represent the
fastest growing population with AIDS.33 Of the 28 trials of
drugs designed to fight HIV, only 131 of 2634 participants were
women. 34 In addition, when the FDA approved AZT in 1987,
not one of the 63 federally-sponsored studies had analyzed its
effects on women. 35
The effects of exclusion from clinical research are far reaching. All women suffer the consequences of studies that include
only men, or that include women, but do not adequately analyze any gender-related differences. Because of the research
gap, "physicians now frequently lack adequate evidence on
whether women . . . will be helped, harmed, or not affected at
all by numerous therapies now endorsed as promoting 'human

28. See id. at 24. The author further noted that the study examined the effects
of particular nutrients on estrogen metabolism, and researchers chose only male
subjects in the belief that estrogen metabolism is similar in men and women. See id.
at 29 n.2.
29. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 61. Women are the "aging
majority" in this country. As of 1990, women represent almost 60% of the population
over 65 and 72% of the population over 85. ORWH REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
Women also have an average life expectancy of 78.6 years, almost 7 years longer
than men. Id. at 8.
30. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 61.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 144 (quoting one doctor's observation that "'[w]e don't know a lot
about HIV in women because almost all the studies that were done originally were
done on men' ").
33. ORWH REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
34. LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 149. For example, women rep·
resented only 5.3% of the research subjects in studies testing drugs for cytomegalovirus retinitis, 7.1% for mycobacterium avium complex, and 7.9% for pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia therapy-yet women with AIDS succumb to these infections at the
same rate as men with AIDS. Id. at 149-50.
35. Id. at 5.
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health.' "36 It is not surprising that women experienced toxic
side effects when given AZT dosages to treat AIDS calibrated to
the ever-popular seventy-kilogram male.37 Physicians treating
women with AIDS are still left guessing at drug dosing. 38
When the results of the study comparing the benefits of AZT to
the drug deoxyinosine were released in 1992, only four percent
of the participants were female, too small a percentage to provide meaningful information to physicians about drug treatment
regimens. 39
Several well-known studies of cardiovascular disease considered only male subjects.40 Although they have had a significant impact on the treatment and prevention of heart disease
in men, these studies have not produced definitive information
about prevention and treatment of women's heart disease.41 In
fact, the lack of research on women's health and gender-blind
health conditions in women may have a dangerous e:ffect.42
Based on the findings of studies of heart disease and cholesterol that included men only, the American Heart Association recommended a diet that could actually elevate the risk of heart
disease for women. 43 A study of 51,529 male health professionals begun in 1986 suggested that moderate drinking and a
decrease in heart disease are causally related."" It is unclear,
however, whether the result of this study can be extrapolated
for application to women's health. For example, unlike men,

36. Dresser, supra note 12, at 24.
37. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 5.
38. See id. at 150.
39. See id.
40. See EDWARD B. DIETHRICH & CAROL COHAN, WOMEN AND HEART DISEASE
11-12 (1992); 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 65.
41. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 65; see also
Nanette K Wenger, Excluswn of the Elderly and Women from Coronary Trials: Is
Their Quality of Care Compromised?, 268 JAMA 1460, 1460-61 (1992) (reporting that
exclusion of women from studies because of an assumption that cardiovascular disease is comparable in women and men "has resulted in sizable gaps in our knowledge about gender differences in efficacy of preventive strategies, • • . diagnostic
methods, responses to medical and surgical therapies, and clinical outcomes for coronary heart disease"). One physician has said, " 'If a fifty-year-old man goes to the
doctor complaining of chest pains, the next day he will be on a treadmill taking a
stress test. If a fifty-year old woman goes to the doctor and complains of chest
pains, she will be told to go home and rest.'" Dresser, supra note 12, at 26.
42. In the Hypertension Detection and Follow-Up study, 168% more women
who were given "'stepped care'" treatment died than women who were on control.
See Vanessa Merton, The Excluswn of Pregnant, Pregnable and Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. Women) from Bwmedical Research, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 369, 383 & n.57
(1993).
43. See Dresser, supra note 12, at 27.
44. See Eric B. Rimm et al., Prospective Study of Alcohol Consumption and
Risk of Coronary Disease in Men, 338 LANCET 464, 464 (1991).
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"women who consume moderate quantities of alcohol have an
increased risk of breast cancer."45
In 1988, the results of a government funded study of
20,000 male physicians revealed that small doses of aspirin
would help prevent heart attacks. 46
Physicians were thought to be the ideal subjects,
knowledgeable and disciplined, and able to comply with complicated research protocols. Women, who comprised 10 percent
of physicians in the United States at the time, were excluded
from the study. Nurses, the vast majority of whom were women, apparently weren't considered up to the task. 47

B.

Gender Disparities in Clinical Decisionmaking

Gender bias extends beyond clinical research into all areas
of health care: "[l]t pervades medicine, beginning with medicalschool admissions and education, encompassing research facilities and medical journals, and culminating in how women are
treated as patients in clinics, hospitals, and physicians' offices
across the country."46 For example, men are more likely to be
referred for diagnostic testing for lung cancer than women, even
where risk factors are equal between the two genders. 49 Women in need of kidney dialysis are approximately 30% less likely
to receive a transplant than men. 50 Men are 6.5 times more
likely to be referred for cardiac catheterization than women. 51
At the same time, 26% of men versus 14% of women receive
clot-dissolving drugs after a heart attack. 52 Further, another
study indicated that physicians are twice as likely to attribute
symptoms of heart disease in women to psychiatric and

45. Charles Fuchs et al., Alcohol Consumption and Mortality Among Women,
332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1245, 1245 (1995). The study also found that, while light to
moderate drinking is associated with decreased cardiovascular deaths in women, this
benefit applies mainly to older women and those women otherwise at risk for coronary disease. See id. at 1249.
46. See THE AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 8, at 91. Unfortunately, there was
no data to substantiate whether an aspirin a day for women would have any impact
on their risk of heart disease.
47. Id.
48. LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 5.
49. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Gender
Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559, 560 (1991) [hereinafter Gen·
der Disparities] (reporting that among men and women with similar smoking habits,
men were twice as likely to receive cytologic studies of sputum; even after smoking
status and other medical considerations were taken into account, men still had 1.6
times the chance of receiving cytologic testing).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 104.
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noncardiac causes.53
With respect to AIDS, it was not until 1993 that the Center for Disease Control (CDC) amended its presumptive definition of AIDS to include those manifestations most common in
women, i.e., cervical cancer, pelvic inflammatory disease, and
vaginal yeast infections.54 After the change, thousands more
women were classified as having AIDS.55 Even after being diagnosed and entering treatment, women still receive fewer
services than men. For example, a male injection drug user
(IDU) with AIDS is 20% more likely to be hospitalized than a
woman with AIDS, and then the hospital costs of treating a
male IDU with AIDS is over $9000 more per year than the
hospital care costs of treating a woman with AIDS.w It is also
worth noting that a large prospective study conducted by Terry
Beirn Community Programs for Clinical Research on AIDS
recently found that HIV-infected women face an increased risk
of death when compared with men.57 The authors of the study
suggest that the reasons for excess mortality in HIV-infected
women might include lower socioeconomic status, domestic
violence, and the lack of social support,53 factors that reflect
differential access to health care for women.~>
9

C. The Role of Gender in the Physician-Patient Relationship
Bias has also been reported in studies that evaluate the
relationship between the gender of a physician and the offering
of gender-sensitive diagnostic practices, such as breast exams,
pap smears, and mammograms. Women who reported having a
male physician as their usual provider were less likely to receive pap tests and mammograms than women who reported
having a female physician as their usual care proVider.w There

53.
54.
55.
56.

See
See
See
See

Gender Disparities, supra note 49, at 560.
LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 148-49.

id.
Fred J. Hellinger, The Use of Health Services by Women with HN
Infection, 28 HEALTH SERVICES REs. 543, 543 (1993).
57. See Sandra L. Melnick et al., Survival and Disease Progression According to
Gender of Patients with HN Infection: The Terry Beim Community Programs for
Clinical Research on AIDS, 272 JAMA 1915, 1915 (1994).
58. See id. at 1919. During a 15 month period of observation, women had significantly lower rate of survival than men, even though disease progression rates did
not differ significantly by gender. Id.
59. See id. at 1915.
60. See Peter Franks & Carolyn l\1. Clancy, Physician Gender Bias in Clinical
Decisionmaking: Screening for Cancer in Primary Care, 31 MED. CARE 213, 213
. (1993).
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was a similar but insignificant trend for breast exams. 61 These
results persisted after "multivariate adjustment for patient age,
race, education, income, insurance status, subjective health
status, other health behaviors, and attitudes toward health care
and health insurance."62
In another study, rates of pap smears and mammograms
ordered were consistently higher for female physicians than for
male physicians. 63 The difference was particularly significant
between physicians in internal medicine and family practice. 64
Women physicians may be more likely to exercise greater diligence in initially and repeatedly offering screening tests. 65
They also may communicate the risk of cancer more effectively.66 Women patients may be more likely to follow through in
obtaining tests suggested by women physicians because they
are more comfortable discussing issues of concern with female
physicians. 67
In her book, You Just Don't Understand, Deborah Tannen
has described differences in the communication styles of men
and women. 66 Some of these differences may, in part, explain
why gender matters in medical care. Because communication is
the fundamental instrument by which physician and patient relate to each other and attempt to achieve therapeutic goals, the
relationship between physician and patient is central to the
process of health care delivery. Physicians must promote
trust-they must hear the patient's story.
As one author has observed, "institutional authority of the
physician and acquiescence to that authority by the patient,
fostered frequently by gender expectations, can make it difficult
for patients to assert their informational needs."69 For example, women who believe they have serious diseases may present
their worries in a vague manner in an effort to avoid being
labeled hypochondriacs. 70

Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 213.
See Nicole Lurie et al., Preventive Care for Women: Does the Sex of the
Physician Matter?, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 478, 479 (1993).
64. See id. at 481.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND (1990).
69. M. Robin DiMatteo, The Physician-Patient Relationship: Effects on the
Quality of Health Care, 37 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 149, 153 (1994).
70. See Kirsti Malterud, Strategies for Empowering Women's Voices in the Medi·
cal Culture, 14 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT'L 365, 370 (1993); see also Leifur
Dungal, Physicians' Responses to Patients: A Study of Factors Involved in the Office
Interview, 6 J. FAM. PRAC. 1065, 1069 (1978) (finding that physicians express anxi·
61.
62.
63.

HeinOnline -- 32 Hous. L. Rev. 1212 1995-1996

1996]

RESEARCH AND WOMEN'S HEALTH

1213

The most difficult physician-patient relationships tend to be
between male physicians and female patients. Some research
has shown that male physicians may discourage information
exchange with female patients. For example, compared to male
physicians, female physicians engage in significantly more positive
talk,
partnership-building,
question-asking,
and
information-giving.71 Similarly, when with female physicians,
patients talk more during the medical visit and appear to participate more actively in the medical dialogue.72 The longest
visits are between female physicians and female patients and
the shortest between male physicians and female patients.73
Both male and female patients are more willing to disclose
symptoms to a physician of the same sex than to a physician of
opposite sex. Research has shown that female-female interactions are characterized by fewer interruptions of patients by
physicians.74 Fear and embarrassment may in fact be further
barriers to health care, especially among special population
groups, including low income blacks, hispanics, and women over
fifty.75
.
A few recent studies have, in fact, surveyed women's attitudes about physician-patient communication. In the 1993 Commonwealth Fund study of over 2500 women and 1000 men, 1
out of 4 women (compared to 12% of men) said that they had
been "'talked down to'" or treated like a child by their physician.76 Nearly 1 out of 5 women (compared to 7% of men) had
been told that a reported medical condition was "'all in [your]

ety, frustration, and less comfort when treating female patients).
71. See Debra Roter et al., Sex Differences in Patients' and Physicians' Commu·
nication During Primary Care Medical Vrsits, 29 MED. CARE 1083, 1089 (1991).
72. See Nancy Zare et al., Sex of Provider as a Variable in Effective Genetic
Counseling, 19 Soc. SCI. & Z..1Eo. 671, 674 (1984) (noting that women who received
genetic counseling from female physicians discussed a wider variety of topics and
addressed more "care counseling issues" than women who were counseled by male
physicians).
73. See Roter et al., supra note 71, at 1087 (indicating that visits with female
doctors led to one-third more total statements than with male doctors). Communica·
tion seems to be enhanced with same sex dyads when (1) the patient prefers to be
treated by a physician of the same sex, (2) sex-specific conditions are being ad·
dressed, (3) conditions of a highly personal or sensitive nature are being treated
such that sex or sexuality are especially relevant, or (4) when a long-term relationship between physician and patient is required. See Carol S. Weisman, Vlomen and
Their Health Care Providers: A Matter of Communication: Communications Between
Women and Their Health Care Providers: Research Findings and Unanswered Ques·
tions, 102 PuB. HEALTH REP. 147, 150 (Supp. 1987).
74. See Weisman, supra note 73, at 150.
75. See Kathy Coyne et al., Reaching Special Populations with Breast and
Ceroical Cancer Public Education, 7 J. CANCER Eouc. 293, 293 (1992).
76. COMMONWEALTH FuND, SURVEY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 7 (1993).
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head.'"77
A recent Gallop survey of 833 women aged 45-60 found
that the physical and emotional effects of menopause most
frequently cited as the greatest concerns were osteoporosis,
emotional well-being, and heart disease. 78 Of the women who
reported these conditions, only about half said their physicians
had discussed emotional symptoms or heart disease with them,
while two-thirds said that their physicians had discussed osteoporosis. 79 Instead, physicians were more likely to discuss shortterm physical symptoms such as hot flashes and night
sweats.80
Communication barriers may be of particular concern to the
older female population. 81 In addition to sensory losses and
concerns about the use of medical jargon, psychosocial factors
were a major concern. 82 Older women may fear being labelled
as a nuisance, hypochondriac, or "'crabby old woman.' "83 Many
older women report being intimidated by doctors and consider
them as god-like entities who are busy with important matters
and should not be bothered with their trivial aches and
pains. 84 Older women may feel particularly timid about private
or embarrassing information and are likely to accept poorly
communicated explanations, believing they are the ones who
are at fault. 85
In another study, health care professionals' impressions of
women with cancer were compared with their impressions of
women with other serious diseases. 86 All the professionals
thought they would feel more tense treating a woman who had
been diagnosed with breast cancer or lung cancer or who had
been burned severely than a woman who had experienced a

77. Id. In general, women reported greater communication problems with their
physicians and were more likely to change doctors because of their dissatisfaction
(41% of all women versus 27% of men). Id. Though women of color were less satis·
fled with their physicians than white women, they were less likely to change physi·
cians or to have access to health care choices. Id. at 10.
78. See Teri Randall, Women Need More and Better Information on Menopause
from Their Physicians, Says Survey, 270 JAMA 1664, 1664 (1993).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See M. Jean Root, Women and Their Health Care Providers: A Matter of
Communication: Communication Barriers Between Older Women and Physicians, 102
PuB. HEALTH REP. 152, 152 (Supp. 1987).
82. See id. at 154.
83. Id. at 155.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Kimeron N. Hardin & B. Jo Hailey, Health Care Professionals' Percep·
tions of Seriously Ill Women, 14 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN lNT'L 7, 7 (1993).
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heart attack.87 The study also examined how different categories of health care professions perceive emotional issues surrounding serious illness.88 It concluded that nurses and psychologists perceived more need for psychological counseling than
did physicians.89
In the context of contraception and reproductive health, the
contrast becomes clear between the provider's biomedical assumptions based on physiological orientation and the woman's
contextual understandings based on knowledge of their social
lives.90 Of even more importance is that medical dominance
over the parameters of interaction produces inadequate communication, which in turn leads to inadequate medical care.91
Physicians may cut off women when they try to raise topics
that are not directly medical in nature. 92 Women come to physicians for help and understanding on how to adjust their bodies to their social lives, whereas the medical model assumes
that women should adjust their social lives to their bodies.93
Gender differences may be further compounded by the
dependency and inequality inherent in the provider-patient
relationship.94 When the power between the parties is unequally distributed, effective participation is undermined and control

87. See id. at 14.
88. See id. at 10.
89. See id. Provider gender may have influenced these results because most of
the nurses were women while most of the physicians were men. See id. Previous
research had found that physicians overrated the importance of pain on cancer patients and underrated the importance that the patients placed on disruption of leisure activities. See id. at 8-9. That previous research also revealed that nurses overrated the importance of physical appearance changes and underrated being able to
complete routine household chores. See id. at 9. In addition, other research had
found that personal reactions of health care providers to diagnoses could affect their
ability to provide objective and comprehensive care. See id.
90. See ALExANDRA D. TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS 5 (1989) ("Contraception, then, illuminates

problems in the doctor-patient relationship in general and the doctor-female patient
relationship in particular.").
91.

Thus doctors who are the group that most needs to hear what patients and
critics are saying, are the least likely group to be listening. . . . The doctorpatient relationship, however, carries a special impetus to avoid such misunderstanding . . . . It can contribute to control or lack of control over reproductive processes, it can improve or decrease health; it can mean life or
death.
Id. at 6.
92. See id. at 5 (noting that the "subtler question• of which topics are allowed
is rarely addressed).
93. See id. at 4.
94. See Patricia Peppin, Power and Disadvantage in Medical Relationships, 3
TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 221, 222 (1994).
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of the ultimate decision is minimized. 95 Without power, patients cannot give effect to their own values without difficulty,
whether on a personal, cultural, religious, or otherwise groupdefined basis. 96 When patients find themselves unable to control decisionmaking, the likelihood increases that unwanted
risks may be imposed on them. 97
Ironically, all this medical attention may harm women, as
evidenced by recent concerns about high rates of hysterectomies
and cesarean sections. 98 In the area of mental health, women
are consistently treated more frequently and more aggressively
than men. For example, numerous studies conducted over the
last twenty years have shown that when men and women present the same physical or emotional complaints, women are
significantly more likely to receive antidepressants, tranquilizers, and other psychotropic drugs. 99
In fact, women do use health services more than men. 100
Nevertheless, the effects of gender on the doctor-patient relationship may undermine the value of the health care they receive. Even though women use more health services and report
more symptoms, 101 we still do not know whether women and
men seeking health care differ in the number or types of symptoms they disclose to the physician. 102 Women may ask more
questions, but we do not know why. 103 It could be attributed
to greater exposure to sources of health information, to greater
acceptance of health-seeking roles, or to less clear information
women receive from their physicians. 104
As noted earlier, women's roles and experiences within the
health care system differ from those of men. Professional patterns of dominance not only mirror, but reinforce social expectations of men as knowledgeable authorities and of women as
deferential servants who follow but do not initiate treatment
programs. The gender imbalance within health care structures

95. See id. at 223.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 171, 180.
99. Women receive 73% of all prescriptions written for psychotropic medication
(the figure rises to 90% when the prescribing physician is not a psychiatrist). Id. at
275-76. Women receive up to 83% of prescriptions for antidepressants, which exceeds
the 66% that one would expect to be based on the two-to-one female-to-male ratio
for depression. Id. at 276. It has been suggested that women's disadvantaged position in society puts them at a higher risk for mental illness. See id.
100. See Weisman, supra note 73, at 147.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 148.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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encourages doctors to accept prevailing social attitudes about
women and illness. In appropriating the authority to define
what is normal and healthy for women, male professionals have
ensured women's continuing dependency on them.
It is this traditional role of women that has, in fact, reinforced the exclusion of women from clinical research. 10:; Until
recent decades, men served as the providers and women as the
caregivers. 106 Society has placed an emphasis on women as
instruments of reproduction rather than on women as individuals with unique personal concerns and needs. 107 Thus, in considering the relative worth of women, the medical community
tended to value reproductive issues over the general health of
women. 108
All of these gender-based obstacles increase exponentially
for pregnant women, who face the added consideration of balancing their own health needs with associated risks to the
fetus. Society has created the expectation that a woman must
always place the well-being of her child before all other concerns. 109 Thus, the pregnant woman bears the highest moral,
ethical, and legal responsibilities to her fetus. 11° Furthermore,
society may stigmatize a woman who does not make an "acceptable" decision concerning her own health and its relation to
that of the fetus:
A woman who refuses medical treatment is seen as irrational if she chooses to rely on the forces of nature or the vlill
of God, rather than on the technological intervention of her
physician; she is irrational if she trusts the medical establishment less than she trusts her own moral or medical judgment;
she is irrational if she fears her own death more than she
fears the death of the fetus. She demonstrates her rationality
by a willingness to deny her self-interest and relinquish her
moral decision-making power. 111

By establishing protectionist policies in clinical research
and health care, society has wrestled the decisionmaking power

105. See Merton, supra note 42, at 386 n.78.
106. See id. at 386.
107. See id. (noting the biomedical research community's "obsession" with the
possibility of pregnancy).
108. See id.
109. See CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE
POLITICS OF FETAL RIGHTS 1 (1993) (arguing that the "notion that the fetus has
rights, as a patient and a citizen, separate from the pregnant woman's, has generated a deep crisis in reproductive relations in the United States"}.
110. See id. at 2 (maintaining that the mother's rights "are potentinlly made
contingent by fetal rights").
111. Id. at 48-49.
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away from women and reinforced the pregnant woman's obligation to conform to social expectations concerning traditional
gender roles. In essence, protectionism devalues women as individuals and characterizes them as vulnerable vessels of reproduction, incapable of making the correct choices concerning
their health and that of their own offspring. 112 It is this
premise, in fact, that puts into context the evolution of regulatory barriers that excluded women from clinical research.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATION: PROTECTIONISM,
PITFALLS, AND PROGRESS

The participation of human subjects in biomedical and
behavioral research is governed by two sets of federal regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (DHEW) and its successor, the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS). The first set of regulations is
DHHS's Protection of Human Subjects Regulations, 113 which
apply to all biomedical and behavioral research conducted by
DHHS or funded in whole or in part by a Department grant,
contract, cooperative agreement, or fellowship. 114 These regulations enumerate general protections for all human subjects plus
additional safeguards for segments of the population who lack
the capacity to give informed consent (i.e., children)115 or are
particularly vulnerable to coercion (i.e., prisoners). 116 Pregnant
women are designated also as a class of "vulnerable" human
subjects who are in need of special protection under these regulations.117

112. See Merton, supra note 42, at 386 (arguing that exclusionary criteria rein·
force a cultural stereotype that is harmful to the interest and progress of women).
113. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (1994). In June
1991, the Basic DHHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, often re·
ferred to as Subpart A, was replaced by the Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409. See Joan P. Porter, The Federal Policy for
the Protection of Human Subjects, 13 IRB: A REviEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RES. 8
(1991). This federal policy has been adopted by 16 federal agencies and departments
and applies to research funded by or subject to regulation from any of these agencies and departments. See id. The regulations provide for Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs) to review research proposals in order to determine, in part, whether
the investigator has complied with informed consent requirements to adequately
protect human subjects. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109.
114. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101.
115. See id. §§ 46.401-.409 (Subpart D-Additional Protections for Children In·
volved as Subjects in Research).
116. See id. §§ 46.301-.306 (Subpart C-Additional Protections Pertaining to Biomedical and Behavioral Research Involving Prisoners as Subjects).
117. See id. §§ 46.201-.211 (Subpart B-Additional Protections Pertaining to
Research, Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women,
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The Human Subjects Regulations do not apply to privately
funded research. A second set of federal regulations, promulgated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 118 regulate privately funded human subjects research that is intended
to introduce a new drug or medical device to the market. 119
The investigational new drug regulations control the conduct of
clinical trials. 120 The FDA regulations adopt parts of the Human Subjects Regulations, including a special section for
protections pertaining to clinical investigations involving prisoners as subjects,121 but do not adopt the sections outlining special protections for pregnant women or fetuses. It has been
through the issuance of FDA guidelines that the participation of
women of "childbearing potential" in clinical trials, until recently, has been severely limited. 122
The combined regulatory impact of both DHHS and FDA
regulations is significant: federal policy governs nearly all human subjects biomedical and behavioral drug research conducted in the United States. An examination of the historical development of federal policy follows in order to illuminate the barriers to the participation of women in clinical research and to
place these barriers in historical context.

and Human In Vitro Fertilization).
118. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-395 (1994).
119. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.48, 56.101-.124, pt. 312 (1995).
120. See id. § 50.1 (providing that the regulations apply to uclinical investigations that support applications for research or marketing permits for products regulated by the [FDA]").
121. See id. §§ 50.40-.48.
122. See FDA, U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF DRUGS 15 (1977). However, the FDA announced on March 24, 1993 that it was lifting the ban on women of childbearing
age participating in early drug trials in order to encourage study of the effects
pharmaceuticals have on women. See Philip J. Hilts, F.D.A. Ends Ban on Vlomen in
Drug Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at BS. Those companies who submit funding applications for clinical research trials that do not include sufficient numbers of
women risk having their applications denied by the FDA. See id. In response to concerns for protection of the fetus, the FDA's guidelines set out that women participants must give informed consent that they are aware of fetal risks inherent in the
study and are informed of the need for taking precautions against pregnancy while
participating in the trial. See id. Thus for the FDA, ~rotection of the fetus" consists
of assuring that there is and will be no fetus. The question remains as to whether
women who are pregnant will be allowed to participate in FDA supported clinical
trials that offer treatment for the woman's health. See generally Guideline for the
Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, 58
Fed. Reg. 39,406, 39,411 (1993) (advising that "[a]ppropriate preeautions should be
taken . . . to guard against inadvertent exposure of fetuses to • • • toxic agents").

HeinOnline -- 32 Hous. L. Rev. 1219 1995-1996

1220
A.

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1201

The History of Regulating Human Subjects Research

During the early 19th century, clinical trials depended
largely upon experimentation with African-American slave women. 123 Anesthesia was not available, and experiments often
. were repeated on these women to perfect methods. 124 It was
only by using slave women that researchers and physicians
were able to experiment with various medical procedures. 125
By the turn of the century, human research subjects were no
longer slave women, but primarily prisoners and other institutionalized populations. 126 In fact, FDA officials estimate that
until 1972, more than 90% of all investigational drugs were
first tested on prisoners. 127
Spurred by abuses in the research community, protectionism arose, in part, because of a deeply felt need to control experimentation on humans. The public viewed experimentation
as a threatening force rather than a gateway to better health.
In 1949, the Nuremberg Code128 set out ethical and legal standards for the conduct of human research aimed at protecting
human research subjects from the types of experimentation
practices used by the Nazis in World War II. 129 Despite codification of the Code, problems persisted, and regulations were
slow to develop in the United States. 130
123. See Ruth B. Merkatz & Suzanne W. Junod, Historical Background of
Changes in FDA Policy on the Study and Evaluation of Drugs in Women, 69 ACAD.
MED. 703, 705 (1994).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id. By 1979 this percentage dropped to less than 15%. Id.
128. See The Nuremberg Code (1949), reprinted in ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS
AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 425 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LEVINE]
("The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential."); see also 1
WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 37-38 (discussing the evolution of
the Nuremberg Code).
129. At one of the Nuremberg Trials, numerous Nazi doctors were tried for war
crimes, which included research atrocities. See ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT
NUREMBERG 286 n.* (1983). The Nuremberg judges, warning that experiments on humans must be "kept within reasonable well-defined bounds," developed a set of principles enumerating the conditions under which medical experimentation on humans
is permissible. See LEVINE, supra note 128, at 425-26 (providing that research must
be performed pursuant to informed, voluntary consent, that the risk imposed on the
subject should be minimal and justified, and that either the subject or the examiner
must be allowed to terminate the experiment at any time). Although long since
expanded and modified, the Nuremberg Code embodies the basic legal, moral, and
ethical limitations that protect human subjects of biomedical research. See Charles
R. McCarthy, Historical Background of Clinical Trials Involving Women and Minorities, 69 ACAD. MED. 695, 696 (1994) (describing the Nuremberg Code as a "watershed event" in the history of medical ethics).
130. See McCarthy, supra note 129, at 696-97.
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By 1953, the National Institutes of Health {NIH) established its first scientific review panel for research involving human subjects. 131 The thalidomide and diethylstilbestrol (DES)
tragedies intensified the drive to make pregnant women specific
targets of protectionism. 132 In part as a result of the thalidomide disaster, Congress passed legislation in 1962 granting the
FDA a new charter for regulating drugs that required researchers to obtain information on safety and efficacy, as well
as informed consent from research subjects. 133
It was not until 1966 that the U.S. Public Health Service
issued its first policy for protection of human subjects, entitled
Policy and Procedure Order 129.134 This policy, which had no
regulatory teeth, continued to evolve over the ne::!l.'t five
years. 135 It soon became obvious that existing policies to protect research subjects were wholly inadequate.
•
By 1973, revelation of research abuses in the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study gained media and congressional attention. 13!3
During the next three years, DHEW and Congress would participate concurrently in the development of regulations to address human experimentation. In 1973, DHEW appointed a
group to study "the development of special procedures for the
use of incompetents or prisoners in biomedical research, compensation of persons injured in clinical investigations, and a
general review of the legal/ethical responsibilities in the conduct of such research."137 Incompetent persons and prisoners,
but not pregnant women, were singled out for special protection.
Later that same year, DHEW published draft regulations
and solicited public comment. 138 The draft proposed special
protections for children, prisoners, and the mentally infirm, 133
but the health needs of pregnant women were not addressed.

131. See Merkatz & Junod, supra note 123, at 705.
132. See id. at 705-06.
133. See id. at 705. In 1962, Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 781 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
134. See McCarthy, supra note 129, at 696.
135. See id. (referring to the Public Health Service policy as "weak. vague, full
of loopholes, and hortatory rather than regulatory").
136. From 1932-73, the U.S. Public Health Service supported a study of untreated SYPhilis, enrolling 400 African-American men, many of whom remained untreated
even after antibiotics were available. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note
3, at 34. It is worth noting that, in spite of all the attention about Tuskegee since
then, it is rare to hear any concern about the women who were sexual partners of
these men exposed unknowingly to syphilis.
137. 38 Fed. Reg. 27,882 (1973).
138. See id. at 31,738.
139. See id.
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Pregnant women, however, were singled out for their role as
"fetal containers" under special categories outlining guidelines
for "research, development, and demonstration activities" on
abortuses and the fetus in utero. 140 Not only did the proposal
presuppose a maternal-fetal conflict, it deemed fetal protection
a natural corollary to regulations protecting children as a special class:
The fetus. Respect for the dignity of human life must not
be compromised whatever the age, circumstance, or
expectation of life of the individual. Therefore, all appropriate
procedures providing protection for children as subjects in
biomedical research must be applied with equal rigor and with
additional safeguards to the fetus. 141

This high level of fetal protection was deemed consistent
with Roe u. Wade/ 42 which had been decided earlier that year:
The recent decision of the Supreme Court on abortion
does not nullify the ethical obligation to protect the developing
fetus from avoidable harm. This obligation, along with the
right of every women to change her decision regarding abortion, requires that no experimental procedures entailing risk
to the fetus be undertaken in anticipation of abortion. 143

As a form of supplemental protection for fetuses, the draft
proposed that all research involving pregnant women would be
reviewed by the Ethical Review Board, unless it was determined by the primary Review Committee that the fetus would
not be exposed to risk. 144 The draft also proposed that
"[r]ecruitment of pregnant subjects for research ... must involve the institution's Protection Committee in a manner approved by the Board, to provide supplementary judgment."145
The pregnant women's autonomous decisionmaking was further
eroded by a paternal consent requirement:
The consent of both parents must be obtained for any research involving the fetus, any statutes to the contrary on
consent for abortion notwithstanding. Both the mother and the
father have an interest in the fetus, and legal responsibility
for it, if it is born. Therefore, the father's consent must be
140. See id.
141. Id. at 31,742.
142. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
143. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,742.
144. See id. However, the concept of a national Ethical Review Board never
actually materialized because fetal research was such a "controversial political issue."
See Gina Kolata, U.S. Rule on Fetal Studies Hampers Research on AZT, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 25, 1991, at A20.
145. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,742 (emphasis added).
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obtained for experimental procedures involving the fetus; consent of the father may be waived if his identity or whereabouts cannot be ascertained, or if he has been judged mentally incompetent. 146
DHEW proposed additional regulations that included
protections for "activities involving pregnant women where the
fetus may be adversely affected." 147 Board review would be required for all research activities that involved pregnant women,
and research activities on pregnant women would be prohibited
if the fetus could be harmed, unless the purpose of the research
was to benefit that particular fetus. 148 The regulations further
required paternal consent as well as maternal consent, if the
father was "available and capable of participating in the consent process" for activities allowable under the regulations but
which might affect the fetus. 149
As DHEW continued to refine its proposed regulations,
Congress continued to investigate research abuses. Days of
testimony detailed various research abuses, including the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study,150 forced sterilization cases in Montgomery, Alabama/51 and the use of Depo-Provera for unapproved purposes and without informed consent. 1G2
As a result of the heavy response to the draft regulations
from DHEW grantee and contracting organizations, 1ro and "coincidentally" with the passage of the National Research Act, 154
DHEW proposed further protective measures. 1!i!i These protective measures were expressly developed to ensure that informed
consent would be obtained from certain classes of research
subjects deemed vulnerable. 155
Because "the majority of the more than 400 letters received
on research with children, born and unborn, touched on one or

146. Id.
147. Id. at 31,747.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation, 1973: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1187-88 (1973) (statement of Senator Edward Kennedy).
151. See id. at 1464-66 (questioning the adequacy of consent in federally
sponsored sterilization programs).
152. See id. at 1314 (noting that Depo-Provera had been used in Alabama and
Tennessee before it had been approved for general use).
153. See 38 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1974) (noting that 450 such responses were received).
154. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
155. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648.
156. See id. These were proposed as Subparts B-F.
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more aspects of research with fetuses, abortuses, and pregnant
women,"157 DHEW proposed the addition of a new and expanded Subpart entitled "Additional Protections Pertaining to
Biomedical Research, Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Abortuses, Pregnant Women, and In Vitro
Fertilization."158 While many comments received by DHEW
objected to the research on the fetus or the pregnant woman if
the research might harm the fetus, 159 DHEW noted that the
absence of such research "would seriously hamper the development of needed improvements in the health care of the pregnant woman, the fetus, and the newborn. "160
The draft regulation was also criticized for the paternal
consent provision, because a paternal consent clause: (1) could
provide men with a veto to health care needed by the woman
or fetus, even though the man had no marital obligations, (2)
could delay necessary medical treatment, and (3) failed to address the validity of consent by pregnant minors. 161 As a result of the comments, DHEW altered the paternal consent provision by requiring paternal consent only if the activity was not
responding to the health needs of the woman and the father
was reasonably available. 162 As DHEW issued these proposed
regulations, the charter of the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects was approved by the Secretary of
DHEW on August 23, 1974. 163
In its mandate, the Commission was charged, in part, with
identifying informed consent requirements for children, prisoners, and the institutionalized mentally ill-populations who
were considered particularly "vulnerable" to informed consent
abuses and coercion. 164 The Commission was also charged
with investigating research involving living fetuses. 165 Interestingly, women who had been victimized by forced sterilization,
Depo-Provera, and other abuses were not designated by Congress as a group requiring special informed consent protection.
157. Id. at 30,649.
158. Id. at 30,653.
159. See id. at 30,649.
160. Id. Some comments criticized the limitation on research activities involving
pregnant women to those activities that did not adversely affect the fetus, except
where the primary purpose of the activity was to benefit the fetus. See id. at
30,651. These critics recommended exceptions for research necessary to meet tho
health needs of the mother and participation in "research aimed at improvement of
methods of abortion, birth control, and genetic intervention." Id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See 39 Fed. Reg. 32,172 (1974).
164. See id.
165. See id.
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The Commission held public meetings and had special reports and papers prepared for its review.u;s It made sih-teen
recommendations regarding research involving fetuses. 167 Two
of the recommendations involved pregnant women:
2. Therapeutic research directed toward the pregnant
woman may be conducted or supported, and should be encouraged, by the Secretary, DHEW, provided such research (a) has
been evaluated for possible impact on the fetus, (b) \vill place
the fetus at risk to the minimum extent consistent ·with meeting the health needs of the pregnant woman, (c) has been approved by existing review procedures with adequate provision
for the monitoring of the consent process, and (d) the pregnant
woman has given her informed consent. (Adopted unanimously.)
3. Nontherapeutic research directed toward the pregnant
woman may be conducted or supported by the Secretary,
DHEW, provided such research (a) has been evaluated for
possible impact on the fetus, (b) will impose minimal or no
risk to the well-being of the fetus, (c) has been approved by
existing review procedures \vith adequate provision for the
monitoring of the consent process, (d) special care has been
taken to assure that the woman has been fully informed regarding possible impact on the fetus, and (e) the woman has
given informed consent. (Adopted unanimously.)
It is further provided that nontherapeutic research directed at the pregnant woman may be conducted or supported (f)
only if the father has not objected, both where abortion is not
at issue (adopted by a vote of 8 t.o 1) and where an abortion is
anticipated (adopted by a vote of 5 to 4). 1cs

166.
See NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIDMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RESEARCH ON THE FETus: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1975) [hereinafter 1975 REPORT]; NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
& BEHAVIOR REsEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, REsEARCH ON
THE FETus: APPENDIX (1975).
Other publications from the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subject of Biomedical and Behavioral Research include: NATIONAL COM?J'N FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF REsEARCH (1978);
NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S. DEP"'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BEUJO!-t'T
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF REsEARCH, APPENDIX VOLUME I (1978); NATIONAL C.oMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF REsEARCH, APPENDIX VOLUME II (1978).
167.
See 1975 REPORT, supra note 166, at 73-76.
168. ld. at 73.
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However, the Commission did not recommend paternal consent
for therapeutic research directed toward the health needs of the
pregnant woman.
DHEW issued the final regulations on August 8, 1975,169
thereby officially extending "additional protections" to research
subjects of biomedical research, development, and related activities involving, among other groups, fetuses, pregnant women,
and in vitro fertilization. 170 DHEW noted that the Commission
drew distinctions between research directed toward the pregnant woman and research directed at the fetus in utero. 171
The Department found this distinction "useful" and adopted
it. 172 In commenting on the Commission's recommendations,
DHEW agreed:
The Commission considered that the woman's right to
health care is preeminent, and recommended essentially no restrictions on research directed toward the health care of the
pregnant woman, so long as the risks to her fetus are minimized as much as possible consistent with meeting her health
needs, and provided that she is fully advised of the risks to
herself and her fetus. 173

As for research directed toward the pregnant woman, but
not for the purpose of meeting her health needs, DHEW found
that there seemed to be "general agreement that such research
should be permitted only if it imposes minimal or no risk to the
fetus." 174 Perhaps most significantly, DHEW admitted that disagreement existed among the commentaries with respect to
paternal consent: "The Department has considered with care
the various arguments with respect to consent other than the
pregnant woman's for nontherapeutic research involving the
pregnant woman, and concludes that such consent should be obtained except where such research involves the health needs of
the woman." 175
It further noted that, in a number of instances, the Commission recommended that research should be permitted if the
mother has consented and the father has not objected. 176 The
Department concluded that "implementation of a provision for

169. Protection of Human Subjects, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975) (codified as
amended at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409).
170. See id. at 33,528-30 (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211).
171. See id. at 33,527.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. See id.
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absence of objection might present serious problems."177 Because the absence of objection can be proven best by requesting
consent, "the Department . . . retained the requirement for
paternal consent when the father's identity and whereabouts
can reasonably be ascertained, and if he is reasonably available."178 The Subpart B regulations 179 were finalized and remain essentially unaltered. 180
The protections provided in Subpart B are in addition to
and supplement the general provisions of Subpart A. 181 Under
Subpart B, no research activities on pregnant women or fetuses
may be undertaken unless animal studies and studies on nonpregnant individuals have been completed first. 182 The risk
posed to the fetus by biomedical research must be minimal,
except when the research activity is designed to meet the
health needs of the particular mother or fetus. 183 Invariably,
the risk to the fetus must always be the "least possible risk for
achieving the objectives of the activity."184 Individuals engaged
in the activity may not participate in the decisionmaking regarding terminating the pregnancy, offer inducements to coerce
the termination, or alter the procedures for terminating the
pregnancy in ways that increase the minimal risk to the pregnant woman or fetus. 185
Section 46.207 of Subpart B specifically regulates research
activities "directed toward pregnant women as subjects" and
severely limits the participation of pregnant women in biomedical research and development by creating a two-tiered test for
participation. 186 A pregnant woman may be involved in research only if: "(1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the
health needs of the mother and the fetus will be placed at risk
only to the minimum extent necessary to meet such needs, or
(2) the risk to the fetus is minimal."187
177. Id.
178. ld.
179. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211.
180. During 1994-95, a Human Subject Regulations Drafting Committee, established by the Public Health Service, considered amending Subpart B in accordance,
in part, with the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine's Committee on the
Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies.
Refer to Part V infra. To date, no final action has been taken on the Drafting
Committee's recommendation.
181. See generally Porter, supra note 113, at 8-9 (discussing the history of
Subpart A).
182. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(1).
183. See id. § 46.206(a)(2).
184. ld.
185. See id. § 46.206(a)(3).(4), (b).
186. Id. § 46.207.
187. Id. § 46.207(a) (emphasis added). ''Minimal risk" is not specifically defined
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If the research activity survives this initial threshold test
for participation, the activity then may be conducted only if the
mother and father 188 are legally competent and have given
their informed consent after receiving complete information
regarding the possible impact on the fetus. 189 The reputed
father's informed consent is not necessary if: "(1) The purpose
of the activity is to meet the health needs of the mother; (2) his
identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained; (3)
he is not reasonably available; or (4) the pregnancy resulted
from rape."190
The concept of "health needs of the mother" is not defined
under the regulations, and as a practical matter, it may be very
difficult to sort out when a proposed activity is to meet the
health needs of the mother, fetus, or both. This lack of clarity
may be quite significant because section 46.208 sets out different standards of paternal consent for activities directed toward
fetuses in utero. 191 Under these circumstances, the reputed
father's consent is required unless "(1) His identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not
in Subpart B, but in the general provisions it is defined to mean risks not greater,
considering probability and magnitude, "than those ordinarily encountered in daily
life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or
tests." Id. § 46.102(i).
188. The term "father" is not defined under the regulations. In fact, it may be
totally premature to label a sexual partner a father in this context. "Parental rights
do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child.
They require relationships more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child,
and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other measures." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Some of the measures courts use to analyze paternal rights in respect to children (not fetuses) include marital status, paternity testing and paternal acknowledgment, the degree of participation in the child's life, and the best interest of tho
child. See, e.g., Sider v. Sider, 639 A2d 1076, 1083-86 (Md. 1994) (listing as factors
that must be balanced in a custody case the establishment of paternity: availability
of a family unit, the child's relationship with the parties, and the best interest of
the child); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994) (analyzing a biological
father's paternal acknowledgment and commitment to parental duties to determine
his parental rights). When the family law of the various states considers paternal
claims over rearing of existing children, father may be defined very broadly. For
example, under New York State law, in addition to men listed in the state's putative father directory, notice of an adoption proceeding must be given to several other
classes of possible fathers of children born out of wedlock, including those the mother identifies as the father in a sworn written statement. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463
u.s. 248, 251 (1983).
.
189. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(b).
190. See id.
191. See id. § 46.208(a). Experiments on the fetus in utero are limited to research to meet the needs of the fetus or research in which the risk is minimal and
the purpose is the "development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot bo
obtained by other means." ld.
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reasonably available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from
rape."192 These artificial distinctions in this context result in
regulatory frustration and the perpetuation of the presumption
that a pregnant woman cannot decide what is best either for
her or her fetus. 193
It is incongruous that the paternal consent requirements in
Subpart B194 have remained in place while DHHS regulations
on research involving children195 only require the permission
of one parent when such research poses either no greater than
minimal risk or the prospect of direct benefit to the child. 196
Although the permission of both parents generally is required
for all other forms of research on children, the consent of only
one parent will be sufficient if the other parent is deceased, unknown, incompetent, or not reasonably available, or when only
one parent maintains legal responsibility for the care and custody of the child.197 Subpart B and its "special" treatment of
pregnant women would become symbolic of the regulatory barriers to research that still remain.

B. A New Era for Inclusion of Women in Clinical Research
The changing view of participation in clinical trials as a
benefit rather than a burden provided the momentum of the

192. Id. § 46.208(b).
193. For example, consider the ACTG 076 trial, "A Phase ill Randomized Placebo-Controlled Trial to Evaluate the Efficacy, Safety and Tolerance of Zidovudine
[ZDV] for the Prevention of Maternal-Fetal HIV Transmission." Tbe goal of the trial
was to measure the effect of ZDV in reducing vertical transmission from mother to
fetus. Tbe inclusion criteria for the study eliminated those women with CD4 cell
counts below 200, those women most sick with AIDS. In addition, there was no
planned long-term follow up for the women who did participate in the trial. Thus, in
a clinical trial that allowed for the study of the effects of ZDV in pregnant women,
the focus actually appeared to be on the fetus. Characterized in this way then, paternal consent was required for research on the fetus (and the pregnant woman)
absent the regulatory exceptions found in 45 C.F.R. § 46.208.
194. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207(b), 46.208(b), 46.209(d).
195. Id. §§ 46.401-.409.
196. See id. §§ 46.404, 46.405, 46.408. Pursuant to § 46.408, the permission of
both parents is required for research involving greater than minimal risk and no
prospect of direct benefit, but likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the
subject's disorder or condition. See id. § 46.40S(b). Research not otherwise npprovable
that presents an opportunity to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious problem
affecting the health or welfare of children also requires permission from both parents. See id. Tbe Commission did not explain its inconsistency in position with respect to parental consent. It is worth noting, however, that the Commission studied
fetal protection under political pressure and, as they admitted, at a hurried pace.
See 1975 REPORT, supra note 166, at 61 (noting that the Commission was "placed
under severe limitations of time by its Congressional mandate").
197. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(b).

HeinOnline -- 32 Hous. L. Rev. 1229 1995-1996

1230

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1201

movement toward increased inclusion of women in clinical research. Beginning with AIDS research, the focus of public attention regarding clinical trials turned toward access rather
than protection. 198 As AIDS activists cried out for improved
access, the public began to realize the numerous advantages
afforded to research participants. 199 These include possible
therapeutic advantages when other treatments are inadequate,
close monitoring of the disease, attention for other ailments,
superior physicians, labs, and testing, more contact with the
providers, remunerations, and contributions to society. 200
Exclusionary gender policies and regulatory barriers to
research have consequently fallen prey to serious scrutiny. In
1983, the U.S. Public Health Service appointed a task force to
address women's health issues. As noted earlier, its 1985 Report concluded that there were significant deficiencies in biomedical research addressing women's health needs: "'The historical lack of research focus on women's health concerns has
compromised the quality of health information available to
women as well as the health care they receive."' 201 The NIH
would now have to take action.
1. NIH Policy: From Encouragement to Requirement. In
1986, NIH issued and implemented guidelines urging funding
applicants to include women in clinical research and requiring a
clear rationale if women were to be excluded. 202 In 1990, a
General Accounting Office (GAO) report203 confirmed that
women were not sufficiently represented in clinical trials. More
specifically, the GAO found that: the policy on women had not
been well-communicated or understood within NIH or the research community; there were inconsistencies in how the policy
had been applied in key stages of the grant review process;
NIH officials had taken little action to encourage researchers to
analyze study results by gender; and NIH had no way to measure the policy's impact on its research, including its effect on

198. See Merton, supra note 42, at 377 (noting the desire of research subjects to
receive access to experimental drugs and therapies).
199. See id. (reporting the battle cry of AIDS advocates: "(T]rials are treat·
ment").
200. See id. at 379.
201. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 43 (citing Task Force
Report, supra note 1).
202. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 15 NIH GUIDE FOR GRANTS AND
CONTRACTS 1 (1986). The 1986 NIH policy applied to extramural research projects
only and not to NIH's own intramural research projects. See id. at 1.
203. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH:
PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING POLICY ON WOMEN IN STUDY POPULATIONS (1990).
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the demographic composition of study populations.2(H
Consequently, by the fall of 1990, NIH announced criteria
for the awarding of research grants, through a series of memoranda and notices, that required the inclusion of women and
minorities in NIH-supported intramural and extramural research.205 The new policy distinguished between extramural
grants awarded to institutions and individuals outside of NIH
and intramural grants awarded to investigators at the NIH.
Extramural grants awarded to conduct human subjects research
were required to include minorities as well as both genders,
except in those cases where the grant applicant could provide
"compelling justification" for exclusion.200 Compelling justification was defined as "strong scientific or practical reasons for
exclusion,"207 including an "unacceptable risk for women of
childbearing age. ~ 08 NIH intramural researchers could exclude
women where there was a "clear rationale" for doing so,m including where involvement of pregnant women "may expose the
fetus to undue risks. "210 This policy remained in effect until
June 10, 1993, when the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993211 was signed into law.212
The NIH Revitalization Act mandates that the Director of
Nlli "ensure" that both women and minority groups be included
in both intramural and extramural research funded by NIH.213
204. See id. at summary (statement of Mark V. Nadel, Associate Director, GAO).
205. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, INSTRUCTION AND INFORMATION MEMoRANDUM OER 90-5: NIH GUIDANCE ON THE INCLUSION OF l\fiNORITIES AND WOMEN
IN CLINICAL REsEARCH STUDY POPULATIONS (1990) (on file with the Houston Law
Review).
206. ld. at 1.
207. The Memorandum OER 90-5 provided that acceptable justifications may
include research on a "predominantly or exclusively ..• male condition," certain
pilot and feasibility studies in which "[g]ender differences may not be germane," research in an area that "has already been extensively studied in women," and in certain instances, studies that would be "prohibitively expensive." Id. at 30.
208. ld.
209. Memorandum from Edward Rall, Deputy Director of Intramural Research,
National Institutes of Health, Policy on Inclusion of Women in Study Population
(Aug. 1, 1990) (on file with the Houston Law Review).
210. Id.
211. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
212. Legislation to mandate the inclusion of women in clinical research also was
proposed during the 1991-92 session of Congress. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE,
supra note 10, at 68 (discussing the NIH Revitalization Amendments of 1991). The
legislation passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but was vetoed
by President Bush because of controversial provisions that lifted the moratorium on
federally funded fetal tissue transplantation research. See id. The Revitalization Act
of 1993 was signed by President Clinton and became Jaw on June 10, 1993. See id.
213. Pub. L. No. 103-43, sec. 131, § 429B(a)(1)(A), 107 Stat. 122, 133. In addition, the Act statutorily authorized the Office on Women's Health within the Office
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On March 28, 1994, NIH issued guidelines pursuant to the Act
that strengthened its prior policy on inclusion in several respects.214 Specifically, they:
• define clinical research to include all research involving
human subjects;215
• direct that women and members of minority
subpopulations be included in all human subjects research·216
• require' inclusion of women and minorities and their
subpopulations in Phase III clinical trials such that
valid analyses of differences in intervention effect can
be accomplished;217
• promote development of outreach programs to recruit
women and minorities and their subpopulations into
clinical studies;218 and

of the Director of Nlli, see id. § 486(o), 107 Stat. at 136; required NIH to establish
internal and external committees to advise it on issues in women's health research,
including gender differences in clinical drug trials and disease etiology, course, and
treatment, see id. § 486(d)(4)(A), 107 Stat. at 137; required NIH to determine the
extent of women's representation among senior physicians and scientists conducting
NIH·supported research and to carry out activities to increase the extent of such
representation, see id. § 486(e), 107 Stat. at 138; and finally, mandated the establishment of a national data system and clearinghouse on research of women's health,
see id. § 486A(a), (b) 107 Stat. at 138.
Under the Act, the entire scientific community shares the responsibility for
fulfilling the intent of the law and ensuring that the results of research are broadly
applicable. Principal investigators assess the theoretical or scientific links between
gender, race, ethnicity, and their topic of study in preparing their applications. See
59 Fed. Reg. 14,508, 14,510 (1994). Institutional Review Boards review Nlli protocols
in terms of the NIH inclusion policy during their review for protection of human
subjects. See id. Peer review groups include a scientific and technical merit evalua·
tion of the inclusion plan and assign appropriate scores for the award of grants. See
id. Finally, the advisory council or board of each institute or center prepares reports
describing the manner in which the institute or center has complied with the provi·
sions of the statute. See id.; see also NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS CONCERNING THE 1994 Nlli GUIDELINES ON THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN
AND MINORITIES AS SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH 8-13 (1994) [hereinafter NIH Q
& A] (providing information to the scientific community concerning the scope of the
policy, applicable definitions of "minorities," and compliance regulations).
214. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508.
215. See id.
216. See id. Although it is very significant that minorities and their
subpopulations are recruited into clinical studies, this analysis is limited to the in·
cluding of women. For a discussion of the importance of inclusion minorities and
subpopulations, see generally 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at
114-19; Dresser, supra note 12, at 24.
217. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508.
218. See id. In addition to numerous educational programs for the scientific com·
munity, ORWH has prepared an Outreach Notebook for the NIH Guidelines on the
Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research. See NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, OUTREACH NOTEBOOK FOR THE Nlli GUIDELINES ON INCLU·
SION OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES AS SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (1994). It has
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do not allow cost as an acceptable reason for excluding
these groups in clinical trials. 219
All biomedical and behavioral research, including small
scale (i.e., Phase I and II), exploratory, or observational studies,
as well as large scale studies, falls within the definition of
"clinical research."220 The policy extends to all research involving the use of human organs, tissues, and body fluids from
living individuals and to graphic, written, or recorded information derived from living individuals.221 Even research that is
exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review is not
exempt from NIH policies on the inclusion of both genders in
study populations.222
Although the inclusion of women is required in all phases
of clinical research, it is only for Phase ill clinical trials that
the guidelines require the performance of valid analysis223 of
clinically important gender differences in response to the
intervention.224 The NIH defines a clinical trial as
a broadly based prospective Phase ill clinical investigation,
usually involving several hundred or more human subjects, for
the purpose of evaluating an experimental intervention in
comparison with a standard or control intervention or comparing two or more existing treatments. . . . The definition includes pharmacologic, non-pharmacologic, and behavioral interventions given for disease prevention, prophylaxis, diagnosis,

also held public hearings and published its report on improving the recruitment and
retention of women in clinical trials. OFFICE OF REsEARCH ON WOMEN'S HEALTH,
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES (1994).
219. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508.
220. Nlli Q & A. supra note 213, at 10. The policy is based on the definition
for human subjects in the federal regulations: "a living individlllll about whom an
investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains: (1) Data
through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2) Identifiable private
information." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(0.
221. See Nlli Q & A. supra note 213, at 11; see also Judith LaRosa et al., Including Women and Minorities in Clinical Research, 4 APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALs 31,
32 (1995) (noting that the "rationale for such a broad definition [of research] is to
detect trends of potential gender, racial, and ethnic differences by obtaining the
greatest possible amount of information from the earliest stages of scientific inquiry").

222. See Nlli Q & A. supra note 213, at 10. The guidelines, however, do not require IRBs to review research that is exempt. For example, pursuant to 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.101(b)(3), research involving the use of educational tests, certain research and
demonstration projects, and food quality studies are exempt from IRB review. See id.
223. Valid analysis is defined as an assessment that will, on average, provide
the correct estimate of the difference in outcomes between the groups of subjects.
See Nlli Q & A. supra note 213, at 13.
224. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508.
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or therapy. Community trials and other population-based intervention trials are also included.225

The objective of such investigation is "to provide evidence leading to a scientific basis for consideration of a change in health
policy or standard of care."226 This definition is much broader
than the FDA definition of Phase III clinical trials, which focuses primarily on clinical investigation of drugs, vaccines, and
biological and medical devices. 227
In designing a Phase III clinical trial, the principal investigator must comply with the following standards for valid analysis of gender differences: if the data strongly indicate the existence of significant differences or are inconclusive about potential differences, the principal investigator will be required to
include sufficient and appropriate recruitment of both genders
in the study design. 228 If the data generated from earlier studies strongly support no significant differences, then inclusion is
not required, but is "still strongly encouraged."229
Pursuant to the Act, women may be excluded from all
phases of a clinical research project if inclusion is "'inappropriate with respect to the health of the subjects,'" is "'inappropriate with respect to the purpose of the research,'" or is "'inappropriate under such other circumstances as the Director of
Nlli may designate.' "230 By example, NIH has stated that

225. Id. at 14,511.
226. Id.
227. See NIH Q & A, supra note 213, at 11 (citing the FDA definition of Phase
III trials as only expanded, controlled, and uncontrolled trials). Phase III trials are
performed after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug has been
obtained. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21. They are intended to gather the additional information about the effectiveness and safety required to evaluate overall benefit-risk
relationship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician labeling. See
id.
228. See NIH Q & A, supra note 213, at 12-13. It is only in the case where
data strongly indicates the existence of significant differences that the trial must be
designed with high statistical power of the intervention effect in the separate gen·
ders. See id. For example, if men and women are thought to respond differently to
an intervention, then the Phase III trial must be designed to answer two separate
primary questions, one for men and the other for women, with adequate sample size
for each. See id. at 12.
229. Id. at 13. Thus, it may be to the benefit of researchers to collect data by
gender in the early phases of clinical research because gender analysis need not be
performed nor will gender be required as subject selection criteria if the data
strongly support no significant differences of clinical or public health importance in
intervention effect between genders.
230. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43
sec. 131, § 492B(b), 107 Stat. 122, 134. NIH has delineated a number of examples of
possible acceptable justifications, including the following instances:
o
One gender (male or female) may be excluded from a study because:
•
inclusion of these individuals would be inappropriate with
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"experimental procedures/treatments . . . [that pose an] unacceptable risk for women of childbearing potential" may be a
possible acceptable justification for excluding women from a
clinical study.231 This justification is carried over from earlier
Nlli policy,232 in spite of the fact that the guidelines expressly
recognize that "[w]omen of childbearing potential should not be
routinely excluded from participation in clinical research. n233
Although "inappropriateness" may sometimes justify exclusion, the Act clearly states that, contrary to former Nlli policy,
cost will not be deemed an acceptable reason for excluding
women in clinical trials.2J.I Many researchers
and
respect to their health (e.g., experimentnl procedures/treatments present unacceptable risk for women of
childbearing potential. It should be noted however, that
women of childbearing potential should not be routinely
excluded.);
o
the research question addressed is relevant to only one
gender; or
o
evidence from prior research strongly demonstrates no
difference between genders; or
o
sufficient data already exist with regard to the outcome of
comparable studies in the excluded gender, and duplication is not needed in this study.
o
One gender is excluded or severely limited because the purpose of the
research constrains the applicant's selection of study subjects by gender (e.g., uniquely valuable stored specimens or existing dntasets nrc
single gender; very small numbers of subjects nrc involved; or
overriding factors dictate selection of subjects, such ns matching of
transplant recipients, or availability of rare surgical specimens.)
o
Gender representation of specimens or existing dntasets cannot be
accurately determined, e.g., pooled blood samples, stored specimens, or
datasets with incomplete gender documentation nrc used, AND this
does not compromise the scientific objectives of the research.
The scientific question requires the use of the snme or n comparable
•
study population as that used in an earlier study and the potentinl
gain in scientific knowledge outweighs the imbalance in the study
population.
o
Research is proposed with a pre-defined unique but underrepresented
population (e.g., an extensive registry of patients with the condition of
interest) and would not be feasible if a different sample were used.
Each of these justifications would be evaluated by Initial Review Groups in
the context of the specific scientific goals and issues being addressed. Depending on the details, these justifications may or may not be considered
adequate and compelling.
NIH Q & A, supra note 213, at 25-26.
231. Id. at 25.
232. Refer to notes 205-12 supra and accompanying te.'tt.
233. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,509. On September 15, 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published its own Policy on the Inclusion of Women and
Racial and Ethnic :Minorities in Externally Awarded Research. See 60 Fed. Reg.
47,947 (1995). It states that "women of childbearing potential should also not be
routinely and/or arbitrarily excluded from participation even though there nrc ethical/risk issues to consider for inclusion and exclusion.a Id. at 47,949.
234. See Pub. L. No. 103-43, sec. 131 § 429B(d)(2)(A)(i), 107 Stat. 122, 134. In
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policymakers have expressed concern about the implications of
this provision. 235 If priority goes to costly "inclusive" projects,
critics have warned the NIH will be limited to funding fewer
studies. 236 Moreover, experts have warned that "if the act is
too rigidly interpreted, it will make costly and unreasonable demands on the scientific research process and impede the implementation of its noble goal."237
On March 28, 1995, the one year comment period to respond to the NIH guidelines ended. 238 A number of respondents expressed serious concern about the cost of expanding
clinical trials to meet the inclusion requirements, particularly
with respect to minority groups and their subpopulations. 239
The statutory mandate, however, was explicit that "'cost is not
a permissible consideration'" and does not authorize the NIH
guidelines to provide otherwise. 240 The more germane question
may well be "'What is the cost of not including women and
minorities?' "241

2. FDA Policy: From Exclusion to Encouragement. The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates privately funded

addition, cost is not an acceptable reason for exclusion in other types of clinical
research except when the study would duplicate data from other sources. See 59
Fed. Reg. 14,509.
235. See, e.g., Sally L. Satel, Science by Quota, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 1995, at
14, 14 (arguing that the regulations inappropriately allow "politicians to dictate how
scientists must do their work" and that "[b]y the time a diligent researcher has
ensured that adequate numbers of minorities participate [in studies], . . . the size
and price tag of the grant proposal will skyrocket").
236. See id. at 16. See generally Marcia Angell, Caring for Women's
Health-What is the Problem?, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 271, 271-72 (1993) (concluding
that "[y]es, women should be included more often in clinical trials, but not according
to a formula that would make clinical trials more difficult than ever and probably
be counterproductive in terms of learning about differential effects in women"); J.
Claude Bennett, Inclusion of Women in Clinical Trials-Policies for Population Subgroups, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 288, 291 (1993) (maintaining that the "global solution" of the NIH Revitalization Act "cannot provide the answers to complex and
varied questions about the effects of therapy on women").
237. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 3.
238. Most of the public comments received focused on the inclusion requirements
for minority groups and their subpopulations, expressing concern about the difficul·
ties in recruiting sufficient numbers, particularly in certain geographic regions. See
Eugene Hayunga, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH POLICY AND GUIDE·
LINES ON THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN (AND MINORITIES) AS SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RE·
SEARCH 4-5 (1995) (unpublished document) (on file with the Houston Law Review).
While some concerns resulted from a misunderstanding of the requirement, others
reflected the need for enhanced outreach activities and improved scientific collabora·
tion. See id. at 4.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. ld.
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human subjects research that is intended to introduce a new
drug or medical device to the market. ~ The FDA's policy on
the inclusion of women in clinical trials is set forth in guidelines. These guidelines are not mandatory interpretations of
FDA regulations, but rather "advisory opinions on an acceptable
approach to meeting regulatory requirements, and research
begun in good faith under such guidelines will be accepted by
the Agency for review purposes unless the guideline (or the
relevant portion of it) has been formally rescinded for valid
health reasons."243
In its 1977 Guidelines, the FDA largely excluded women of
childbearing potential from clinical trials:
2 2

In general, women of childbearing potential should be excluded from the earliest dose ranging studies. If adequate information on efficacy and relative safety has been amassed during Phase II, women of childbearing potential may be included
in further studies provided Segment II and the female part of
Segment I of the FDA Animal Reproduction Guidelines have
been completed. All three Segments should be completed before large-scale clinical trials are initiated in women of childbearing potential.2«

Although the 1977 FDA Guidelines largely excluded women
from clinical trials, they did provide for three exceptional circumstances. Women of childbearing potential could undergo
experimental drug testing if: (1) the purpose of the drug was to
save or prolong life, (2) the drug belonged to a class of compounds for which teratogenic potential had already been established in animals, or (3) institutionalization of the woman had
allowed investigators to verify that she was not pregnant.2.c;
What is noteworthy in these guidelines is the language
used both to "protect" and exclude women from clinical trials.
Women of childbearing potential "may" be included if prior
242. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360.
243. FDA, U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
FOR THE CLINICAL EvALUATION OF DRUGS 5 (1977} [hereinafter 1977 GUIDELINES).
A woman of childbearing potential is defined as a premenopausal female
capable of becoming pregnant. This includes women on orol, ilijectable, or
mechanical contraception; women who are single; [and] women whose husbands have been vasectomized or whose husbands have received or are utilizing mechanical contraceptive devices. Women in certain institutions, e.g.,
prisions [sic], although of childbearing potential, could be considered as not
in the appropriate environment to become pregnant during the administration of an investigational drug. However, women in mental institutions could
become pre~t.
Id. at 15.
244. Id.
245. See id.
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animal studies have been completed. Also, all three segments
"should" be completed before allowing women of childbearing
potential to participate. In fact, prior animal reproduction studies are not required prior to Phase II and Phase III clinical
trials, and FDA regulations stipulate that nonclinical studies
are to be performed "as appropriate" for reproductive and fetal
effects. 246 The FDA allows drug manufacturers to market
drugs without reproductive testing, as long as notice of this fact
is included in the product label. 247
The 1977 Guidelines briefly addressed the FDA's position
on male reproductive effects:
Where testicular abnormalities or abnormalities of spermatogenesis have occurred in experimental animals or where chromosomal abnormalities are anticipated (e.g., alkylating
agents), the criteria for inclusion of males in Phase I, II and
III depend upon the nature of the abnormalities, the dosage at
which they occurred, the disease being treated, the importance
of the drug, and the duration of the drug administration. In
some cases, special written consent forms, even in Phases III,
may be required. 248

What is noteworthy about these earlier guidelines is the
risk/benefit approach for inclusion of males, even when male
reproductive abnormalities may result from the drug. Whereas
women of childbearing potential can be excluded wholesale from
early clinical trials for the purpose of protecting the fetus, the
presence of documented harm is not sufficient to exclude males
with equal potential for childbearing. Rather, it is the degree of
harm that determines whether a male will be included in a
given clinical trial.
The practical result of the 1977 Guidelines was that drugs
could be marketed without ever being tested on women. Ironically, the FDA could approve drugs, the toxicity of which was
unknown in women and fetuses, for use on the very populations
it sought to protect-pregnant women and women of childbearing potential. 249 Moreover, by following FDA guidelines and
attempting to "protect" women of childbearing potential (and

246. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 137.
247. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(b)(i)(c) (1995).
248. 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 243, at 16.
249. See Merton, supra note 42, at 381-82 (observing that researchers bar almost all fertile women from research, but "when it comes time to prescribe, market,
and profit from drugs, drug companies do not bar women, including women of childbearing capacity"). Merton notes that the researchers avoid responsibility for this
apparent double standard by truthfully asserting that they have no information
about the possible risks of the drug to pregnant women or fetuses. See id. at 382.
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themselves from liability for research injuries), drug manufacturers could find themselves exposed to even greater potential
liability should the adverse affects of a drug be discovered after
it was marketed to the general public. 260
The 1977 Guidelines were considered by many to reflect
gender stereotyping more than concerns about good science.2:n
In 1992, at the urging of women's health advocacy groups, the
Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues requested a GAO
audit of the FDA As expected, the GAO found that women
were underrepresented in drug trials, especially in the earliest
stages of new drug research. 252 As a result of the GAO audit
and public pressure, the FDA issued a new guideline in 1993
for the inclusion of women in drug research.
The FDA's 1993 Guideline, entitled "Guideline for the
Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical
Evaluation of Drugs,"253 loosened many of the restrictions it
formerly had imposed on researchers and lifted the blanket ban
on the inclusion of women of childbearing potential in new drug
research. 254 FDA policy now was beginning to move in the
same direction of NIH policy on the inclusion of women. 255
The 1993 Guideline provides that sponsors are expected to

250. Refer to Part IV infra.
251. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 138 (citing Ehin L.
Kinney et al., Underrepresentation of Women in New Drug Trials, 95 ANNALs Iz-.."rERNAL MED. 495 (1981)).
252. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 203, at 2-3.
253. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,406 (1993).
254. See id. at 39,408. The FDA's intent in loosening its restrictions was to
"remove the unnecessary Federal impediment to inclusion of women in the earliest
stages of drug development." Id. In the background paper accomp:m)ing the 1993
Guideline, the FDA explained that the 1977 Guidelines may have "discouraged participation of women in drug development studies and may have resulted in a 'paucity of information about the effects of drugs in women.'" 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH
REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 138-39 (citation omitted).
255. The FDA also acknowledged that its 1977 Guidelines were inconsistent with
current policies prohibiting gender discrimination as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). In Johnson
Controls, the Court held that excluding all women, except those whose infertility was
medically documented, from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure exceeding OSHA guidelines was facially discriminatory and in violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. at 211. The FDA maintained that removal of the prohibition on participation of women of child-bearing potential in Phase I and early Phase ll trials is
consistent with congressional efforts, laid out in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
and interpreted in Johnson Controls, to prevent unwarranted discrimination against
such women. See 58 Fed. Reg. 39,408; Ruth Merkntz et al., Vlomen in Clinical Trials of New Drugs: A Change in Food and Drug Administration Policy, 329 NEW
ENG. J. !\fED. 292, 295 (1993) (maintaining that congressional action and Supreme
Court decisions suggest that women should have the right to make their own riskbenefit choices about their pregnancies). For an in-depth discussion of the ethical
and policy implications of Johnson Controls, refer to subpart IV(A).
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include a full range of patients in their studies,256 to carry out
appropriate analyses to evaluate potential subset differences in
the patients they have studied,257 to study possible
pharmacokinetic differences in patient subsets, 258 and to carry
out targeted studies to look for subset pharmacodynamic differences that are especially probable, suggested by existing data,
or that would be particularly important if present. 259 Consistent with its historical concern for fetal protection, the FDA
also made clear that "[a]ppropriate precautions should be taken
in clinical studies to guard against inadvertent exposure of fetuses to potentially toxic agents and to inform subjects and patients of potential risk and the need for precautions."260 What
is new is the FDA's recognition that women, including those of
childbearing potential, "are competent to give informed consent
to their participation in research trials, and that this informed
consent provides the necessary insulation to protect researcher
and manufacturer from suit by mother or possible child for all
but negligent enrollment practices."261
Unfortunately, the 1993 Guideline has exceptions and other
provisions that render it potentially weak. For example, the
FDA undermines its own guidance that gender analyses be
performed by stating that its recommendations need not always
be followed. 262 In addition, the 1993 Guideline would not bar
256. "The patients included in clinical studies should, in general, reflect the
population that will receive the drug when it is marketed. For most drugs, therefore,
representatives of both genders should be included in clinical trials in numbers ade·
quate to allow detection of clinically significant gender-related differences in drug response." 58 Fed. Reg. 39,410.
257. "Analyses to detect the influence of gender should be carried out both for
individual studies and the overall integrated analyses of effectiveness and safety." Id.
258.
Using either a specific pharmacokinetic study or a pharmacokinetic screen,
the pharmacokinetics of a drug should be defined for both genders. . . .
Three pharmacokinetic issues related specifically to women that should
be considered during drug development are: (1) The influence of menstrual
status on the drug's pharmacokinetics, including both comparisons of premenopausal and postmenopausal patients and examination of within-cycle
changes; (2) the influence of concomitant supplementary estrogen treatment
or systemic contraceptives (oral contraceptives, long-acting progesterone) on
the drug's pharmacokinetics; and (3) the influence of the drug on the phar·
macokinetics of oral contraceptives.
ld. at 39,410-11.
259. "Evidence of [pharmacodynamic] differences should be sought, however, in
the data from clinical trials by carrying out the by-gender analyses suggested in the
guideline on the clinical and statistical sections of NDA's." Id. at 39,411.
260. Id.
261. R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us to Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical
Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 135, 158 (1993).
262. See 58 Fed. Reg. 39,408 (observing that "at this time [the FDA does not]
perceive a regulatory basis for requiring routinely that women in general or women
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a study protocol that required surgical sterilization for women
of childbearing potential, nor does it prohibit sponsors from excluding women of childbearing potential without evidence of
fetal toxicity. 263 And, as under the 1977 Guidelines, Phase I
testing in human subjects may begin prior to the completion of
animal reproduction studies, thus restricting the right of both
women and men to be fully informed of the potential reproductive risks of the therapy they are to receive.~
The FDA also failed to set forth its policy in regulation.
The 1993 Guideline, therefore, does not have the force of law; it
merely communicates recommended procedures to organizations
who wish to market new drugs. Despite its recognition that the
"change in FDA's policy will not, by itself, cause drug companies or IRB's to alter restrictions they might impose on the
participation of women of childbearing potential, ,.,..65 the FDA
nonetheless refrained from mandating the inclusion of women.
The FDA rationalized that it was "confident that the interplay
of ethical, social, medical, legal and political forces will allow
greater participation of women in the early stages of clinical
trials"266 and would not require inclusion of women in trials
particularly routinely. 267 The FDA's 1993 Guideline concluded
with the following disclaimer: "This guideline does not bind the
agency, and it does not create or confer any rights, privileges,
or benefits for or on any person.n268 Only time will tell whether or not the FDA is right.

of childbearing potential be included in particular trials").
263. See 59 Fed. Reg. 39,406.
264. The 1993 Guideline states that u[i)f no relevant information is available,
the informed consent should explicitly note the potential for fetal risk." 58 Fed. Reg.
39,411. This provision may allow trial sponsors to place special conditions on the en·
rollment of women even when no analysis of reproductive effects has been undertaken. By allowing, if not encouraging, trial sponsors to do so, the FDA has substantially weakened the informed consent process and is, in effect, "in violation of its
own duty to investigate the risk of adverse reproductive effects." THEREsA
MCGoVERN, PROPOSAL TO ELThfiNATE OBSTACLES FACING WOMEN IN THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PRocESS 21 (1994) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Houston

Law Reuiew). Further, because male-mediated reproductive effects need not be studied prior to human subjects testing, even though "special conditions" are not placed
on their enrollment in clinical trials, men, too, are deprived of their right to be fully
informed of potential reproductive risks. See id.
265. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,408.
266. Id. at 39,408-09.
267. Id. at 39,408.
268. Id. at 39,409.
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IV. ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

Denying women access to clinical research and treatment
raises questions of gender discrimination in the context of both
statutory and constitutional law. Generally, the Supreme Court
has affirmed women's rights to decisionmaking regarding behaviors that affect reproductive status.269 To date, however, there
is little, if any, case law on the legal issues raised by clinical
research and gender disparities in medical treatment. There is,
however, a relatively recent Supreme Court case referred to and
relied on by women's advocates and federal regulators alike to
support the ethical, legal, and policy justifications for removing
the barriers to women's participation in clinical research and
recognizing the historical treatment of women for what it has
been-gender discrimination.

A

Johnson Controls: Laying the Ethical and Public Policy
Foundation

The Supreme Court, in UAW u. Johnson Controls, 210 reasoned that decisions regarding future children are to be made
by those who conceive and bear the children, not by employers
or the courts. 271 Johnson Controls involved a fetal protection
policy in which the company barred all fertile women from jobs
involving lead exposure exceeding the standard set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for workers planning
to have children.272 Petitioners claimed that the policy violated
Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA).27a
The Court found that the Johnson Controls policy created a
facially discriminatory classification based on gender. 274 In essence, the policy "'[did] not pass the simple test of whether the
evidence shows "treatment of a person in a manner which but
for that person's sex would be different:"' "275 Because the pol-

269. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (protecting a woman's
right to obtain an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (protecting a married woman's right to contraceptive choice).
270. 499 u.s. 187 (1991).
271. See id. at 211. Refer to text accompanying note 315 infra.
272. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 191-92.
273. See id. at 192. Refer to note 350 infra and accompanying text for the language of the PDA.
274. 499 U.S. at 197.
275. Id. at 200 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 711 (1978), quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1170 (1971)).
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icy involved disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination, the Court required Johnson Controls to establish that
sex was a "'bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.' "276
Although Johnson Controls alleged strong safety concerns,
the Court pointed out the narrow circumstances under which
the safety exception applied. 277 Consequently, the company
could not justify its policy on grounds that it was designed to
protect pregnant women. 278 Additionally, the Court favored the
mother's dominion over her unborn or potential offspring rather
than a fetal protection policy enforced by an employer.279
Turning toward legislative intent, the Court stated that
"Congress made clear that the decision to become pregnant or
to work while being either pregnant or capable of becoming
pregnant was reserved for each individual woman to make for
herself."280 Thus, Johnson Controls could not use fetal protection as a justification for its discriminatory policy.
The Court's holding in Johnson Controls relies on three
conclusions. First, men rarely are excluded from activities based
on concerns for their reproductive health. Whereas men are
often given the choice of risking their reproductive futures,
women are not granted these choices; therefore, this is in and
of itself discrimination. 281 Second, the PDA prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy status. The Court noted that "'discrimination based on . . . pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of . . . sex.' "282 Third, the lack of a "malevolent
motive" and claims of beneficence do not overcome a presumption that a gender-based distinction is sex discrimination.~
The Court's reasoning sets the policy groundwork for addressing gender disparities in clinical research. While the Johnson Controls Court framed its discussion in the context of discrimination in the workplace, the decision nevertheless supports
the policy position that excluding women from clinical trials by
virtue of their reproductive health is discrimination against

276. Id. at 203 (citation omitted).
277. See id. at 202. The safety exception to the BFOQ defense generally applies
where gender creates a risk to others and sex or pregnancy actually interferes v.ith
the employee's ability to perform the job. See id. at 204.
278. See id. at 206.
279. See id. at 206-07.
280. Id. at 206.
281. See id. at 197.
282. Id. at 199 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
462 u.s. 669, 684 (1983)).
283. See id.
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women as women. The Court also undercut rationales of
nonmalevolence and beneficence as the basis for excluding women from the same opportunities as men. 284 Although the early
rationale for excluding women from clinical trials was based
historically on ethical concerns designed to protect fetuses,
those same concerns have served to restrict women's access to
important clinical research on women's health and to potential
treatment alternatives.
The Johnson Controls Court was not content to simply note
that women should not be subjected to discrimination in general. It was very specific as to the latitude that women possess in
making decisions about their own behaviors: women should not
be forced to choose between pregnancy and a job,285 and the
decision as to reproductive choice is to be left to the woman,
not to the company. 286 Thus, women are to be the sole arbiters of their decisions regarding their health behaviors.
Women should not be forced to choose between pregnancy
and the availability of future treatment to participate in clinical
trials. This is especially applicable to women with HIV when
clinical trials may afford their only opportunity for access to
treatment. 287 The basis for this would be the Court's second
provision, namely that decisions bearing on reproductive health
status are to be exercised solely by a woman, not a company,
and almost certainly not the government. 288 The Court went
on to note that approximately nine percent of all fertile women
become pregnant per year and that this rate is much less in
certain subgroups of women. 289 The Court's strong message is
that numbers of women "vulnerable" to pregnancy, whatever
the number, are insufficient to discriminate against women as a
whole. 290 As to whether society may extend a paternalistic veto over a woman's decision, the Court further clarified its directive: "It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for
individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive
role is more important to herself and her family than her economic role. Congress has left this choice to the woman as hers

284. See id.
285. See id. at 204 (emphasizing that women who are as capable as men to
perform their jobs may not be forced to choose between having a child and having a
job).
.286. See id. at 206-07.
287. See Merton, supra note 42, at 377-78.
288. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204, 211.
289. !d. at 207.
290. See id. ("[An employer's] fear of prenatal injury, no matter how sincere,
does not begin to show that substantially all of its fertile women employees are
incapable of doing their jobs.").
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to mak.e."291
In spite of this strong language, it is important to emphasize again that Johnson Controls is a Title VII case involving
sex discrimination in employment.292 Thus, one might argue
that Johnson Controls may not apply directly to the exclusion
of women from clinical research and health care benefits. Yet,
regardless of whether the legal holding of Johnson Controls
extends beyond the employment context, the dictum provides
the ethical and public policy foundation for addressing gender
discrimination in clinical research and health care.
There is a real need for society to acknowledge that women
are to be trusted in the decisions that they make for themselves and others. Women, as competent individuals, should be
free to.incorporate their own values and preferences into medical decisions that affect their bodily integrity. This would seem
to place women, even those who are pregnant, in the best position to decide the advisability of entering a clinical trial. For
women with AIDS, and for women with rare diseases, participation in a clinical trial represents a good in and of itself, in that
access to the trial may literally be synonymous with the only
available treatment. 293 In addition, clinical trials provide good
primary health care to women whose access to health care may
be otherwise limited. 294

B. Constitutional Issues
The exclusion of women from clinical research and other
forms of health care raises important constitutional issues. The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution expressly prohibits states from taking any action that deprives
any person of life or liberty or that denies any person the equal
protection of the laws.295 Thus, some commentat.ors and

291. Id. at 211.
292. See id. at 192.
293. See Merton, supra note 42, at 377-80 (arguing that clinical trials are treatments for many reasons: first, new and unlicensed drugs may be obtained only by
serving as a research subject; second, patients are introduced to new applications of
existing therapies; third, participants can receive therapies without charge; and finally, the program itself has many therapeutic aspects because of the attention and
close monitoring the patient receives).
294. See id. at 379.
295. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. These provisions are "particularly relevant to questions of participation in clinical research. • 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 143; see also Megan R. Golden, Note, When Pregnancy
Discrimination is Gender Discrimination: The Constitutionality of Excluding Pregnant
Women from Drug Treatment Programs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1832, 1835 (1991) (arguing that refusal by drug treatment programs to treat pregnant women \iolates the
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advocates have concluded that the "exclusion of women from
government-sponsored or government-regulated research violates
constitutional standards of liberty and equality."296
1. Privacy and Liberty Interests. Decisional privacy about

matters affecting health care is among the liberties protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 297 Where fundamental rights are
implicated, a policy that infringes upon them is subject to
"strict scrutiny," and courts will strike down the policy unless
the government can show that the policy furthers a "compelling'' governmental purpose that cannot be achieved by a less
restrictive means. 298 The policy also must be narrowly tailored
to meet its goal. 299 To the extent that the exclusion of women
of childbearing potential from clinical research and other forms
of health care burdens a fundamental right, these policies are
subject to the strict scrutiny test. If inclusion in clinical trials
is not seen as a fundamental right, a lower standard of review
would be applicable.
Much of the analysis regarding a woman's right to privacy
and self-determination has evolved in the context of a woman's

Fourteenth Amendment).
296. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 143. Although private
actors are not subject to constitutional governance, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 13 (1948) ("[A]ction inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is
only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States."), the argument can
be made that private firms, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, act in response
to government regulation and have such close ties to the governmental agency that
regulates them to classify their conduct as "government action" and subject to the
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974) (finding that a "heavily regulated utility with at least
something of a governmentally protected monopoly" may possess sufficient nexus
with the state to render the private utility a state actor); see also Dilan A. Esper,
Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 663, 683-85 (1995)
(observing that, in certain contexts, the Supreme Court has found state action where
government involvement appeared to be limited to regulation but has declined to do
so in other contexts and hypothesizing that the Court predicates its nexus analysis
to a large extent on the rights at issue rather than the level of government involvement in a particular case).
297. For example, the Court has recognized a competent individual's liberty
interest with respect to the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration, see
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990), reproductive
rights with respect to contraceptive choice, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 486 (1965), and a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, see Roe v. Wade,
410 u.s. 113, 154 (1973).
298. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-7, at 1454
(2d ed. 1988).
299. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the constitution . . . .").
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right to abortion. In Roe v. Wade, 300 the Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to strike down a state law that
infringed upon a woman's fundamental right to terminate her
pregnancy. 301 The issue as to whether the woman or the state
retains a fundamental interest in medical decisionmaking has
been further refined by the Court over the last two decades. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,302 the Supreme Court's most recent abortion ruling, the Court reaffirmed the core of Roe when
it noted:
It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that
Roe's essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three
parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to
choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it
without undue interference from the State. Before viability,
the State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to
the woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a
confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after
fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies
which endanger a women's life or health. And third is the
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman
and the life of the fetus that may become a child. These principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to
each.303

Casey has several implications for federal research regulations. The state has a legitimate interest in regulating clinical
trials as a form of medical intervention, to protect the health of
. the woman and life of the fetus, much like it has the legitimate
interest in regulating abortion as a medical procedure. However, while Roe established a woman's fundamental right to obtain an abortion, no fundamental right to health care in general, or to participate in clinical trials, in particular, has been established.304 Nevertheless, federal regulations that erect barriers to participation· in clinical trials may infringe upon liberty
interests, in effect placing concern for fetal well-being above the
well-being of the mother. Such liberty interests can be found in
two areas.

300. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
301. See id. at 164-65.
302. 505 u.s. 833 (1992).
303. Id. at 846.
304. See Charo, supra note 261, at 152 (contending that a liberty interest should
be inlplicated when women are denied potentially life-saving interventions, even
though a constitutional right to health care does not exist).
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The first group of liberty interests is grounded in personal
autonomy and bodily integrity related to an individual's liberty
interest in medical decisionmaking. The Court in Casey stated
that "[j]ust as the Due Process Clause protects the deeply personal decision of the individual to refuse medical treatment, it
also must protect the deeply personal decision to obtain medical
treatment."305 Because participation in a clinical trial may be
tantamount to obtaining the only life-saving or life-prolonging
treatment currently available to a terminally ill person, the
ability to choose this course of treatment is an issue of personal
autonomy in medical decisionmaking.
The second group of protected interests are those related to
"personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."306
These interests are implicated, for example, when a woman
makes an informed choice to ingest a drug needed for health
reasons that may or may not have teratogenic effects on future
offspring.
Furthermore, the human subjects regulations requiring
paternal consent for a pregnant woman to participate in a clinical trial significantly burden a woman's liberty interests and
would not withstand constitutional challenge. 307 Although the
government has the right to regulate the conduct of clinical trials to protect all research subjects and ultimately the public at
large, Subpart B creates a paternal veto that appears to contradict Roe and its progeny. In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,308 the State attempted to argue that the decision to
seek an abortion represented a change in family status and
that both partners had interests in decisions affecting reproduction. 309 The Court countered that the state could not grant

305. Casey, 505 U.S. at 927 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, dissenting in part) (relying on Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
306. Id. at 851.
307. Requiring a reputed father's consent, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207(b) &
46.208(b), is tantamount to veto power, not only over health matters involving a
fetus, but, as a practical matter, over the mother seeking participation in a clinical
trial (and accompanying treatment) for herself. Although the Supreme Court recognized in Casey that fathers do possess interests in their children that may be equivalent to a mother's interests, the Court distinguished children from fetuses and
found that because decisions involving the latter affect the bodily integrity of the
mothers carrying them, the liberty interests of pregnant women retain priority in
these decisions. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-96. For a discussion of Subpart B and 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.207, 46.208, refer to notes 181-97 supra and accompanying text.
308. 428 u.s. 52 (1976).
309. See id. at 68.
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power to an individual that the state itself did not have.310 In
other words, because the state cannot regulate abortion in the
first trimester, that state lacks the constitutional power to
grant to another-in this case, a reputed father-the power to
veto a woman's decision to seek an abortion. 311
The Danforth court rooted its decision in a basic privacy
argument first enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut,312 in
which the Court held that a married individual's right to engage in reproductive decisionmaking and contraceptive use is
protected.313 The right to privacy was developed further in
Eisenstadt v. Baird:314 "If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."315
Since Roe v. Wade, the Court has ruled consistently that
decisions regarding reproduction remain exclusively with the
woman in the first trimester. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has explicitly recognized that the woman as an individual adult
has full decisionmaking power over both her reproductive status
and decisions independent of any paternal interest. In Danforth,
the Court determined that the individual whose choice should
prevail is the woman's, as the one "who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two."316
Finally, the Court admitted that granting to a father virtual
"veto power" over a mother's reproductive decisionmaking
contravenes the state's intended goal of preserving the relationship between the two individuals.317
This principle was reinforced in Casey when the Court
affirmed the Danforth principle that there is no state aim to be
met by giving one spouse veto power over the reproductive
decisionmaking of another. 318 The weight of the decision should
reside with the individual bearing the greatest burden of the
decision, namely the woman herself.319 The Court questioned

310. See id. at 69.
311. See id.
312. 381 u.s. 479 {1965).
313. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 n.lO {1976) {citing
Griswold and emphasizing the time honored notion of the right to privacy in marriage).
314. 405 u.s. 438 {1972).
315. Id. at 453.
316. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
317. Id.
318. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 {1992).
319. See id. at 897.
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whether a woman should be required to notify her partner and
obtain his consent if she engages in behaviors regarding contraception or other activities such as surgery that may "potentially''
affect her reproductive ability. 320 In recognizing the dangers of
allowing spousal notification, the Court further warned: "Perhaps
next in line would be a statute requiring pregnant married
women to notify their husbands before engaging in conduct
causing risks to the fetus. "321
The Court, in commenting so directly on this issue, suggests
how it might rule. Such a requirement would constitute an
invasion of privacy and a violation of decisionmaking rights
regarding behavior affecting reproduction, and, therefore, would
be unconstitutional. The Court concluded that the Constitution
"protects all individuals, male and female, married or unmarried,
from the abuse of governmental power, even where that power is
employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the individual's
family. "322
The Casey Court was not content to consider only the
ramifications of spousal notification in principle, but engaged in
rather extensive dicta describing spousal abuse that the Court
speculated might result from the requirement of partner
notification. The Court presented evidence that women of all
social and economic levels are subject to abuse, citing statistics
that pregnancy itself may incite a partner to violence that could
be directed not only against the woman herself, but against other
family members including children. 323
Spousal notification also has repercussions for maintaining
a woman's confidentiality regarding her pregnancy and preserving
the overall well-being of the woman and her family. A requirement of spousal notification would mean that a woman's private
reproductive decision could be revealed by a subpoena of her
medical records; in addition, should a woman need to move her
family to a shelter to protect them from an abusive partner,
requiring spousal notification may reveal her location, resulting
in further abuse to herself and her children. 324
These latter points are especially relevant to pregnant
women who wish to participate in clinical trials, particularly
those women with HIV. As noted earlier, Subpart B requires

320. See id. at 898.
321. Id.
322. ld.
323. Id. at 892-93. Spousal abuse may not be limited to physical violence, but also
may include psychological abuse and the restriction or elimination of economic
resources to the family by the offending partner. ld. at 893.
324. See id. at 888-90.
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that, absent certain exceptions, researchers may not only notify,
but are required to obtain consent from the reputed father. 325
Requiring a woman with HIV to notify her partner that she
wishes to be included in a clinical trial for experimental HIV
treatment for either her or the fetus (and to seek his consent)
would be tantamount to a disclosure of her HIV status to that
partner. The possibilities of physical or emotional abuse, or even
separation from the partner, are realities for many women
following disclosure of HIV status.328 The fear of domestic
violence may preclude women with HIV, many of whom are poor
with few economic opportunities or alternatives, from participating in a clinical trial that offers hope for their illness.327
Thus, requiring paternal consent invites exactly the type of
potential abuse of the woman or her family described in Casey.
Not only may the woman risk harm in an existing abusive
situation by informing her partner that she is pregnant, but even
more violence against the woman or her family may be induced
by informing the partner of the woman's HIV status. Women are
harmed in one of two ways by this requirement. Either they are
excluded from a chance for treatment for themselves or they risk
abandonment and violence from a partner who has been informed
of the woman's HIV status.
2. Equal Protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment restricts the right of the government to
treat similarly situated persons differently.32s Although there is
325. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207(b), 46.208(b).
326. See Karen H. Rothenberg et al., Domestic Violence and Partner Notification:
Implications for Treatment and Counseling of Women with HN, 50 JM.fWA 87, 91
(1995) (revealing that in a study of health care providers, fears of violence, abuse, and
abandonment were among the most important for pregnant women with mv in
resisting spousal notification); Karen H. Rothenberg & Stephen J. Paskey, The Risk
of Domestic Vwlence and Women with HIV Infection: Implications for Partner Notifica·
tion, Public Policy, and the Law, 85 Al-L J. PUB. HEALTH 1569, 1571 (1995) ("The
data ... suggest that some lnV-infected women may resist notification because they
fear domestic violence, emotional abuse, or abandonment.").
327. In the ACTG 076 clinical trial, refer to note 193 supra, researchers reported
that the requirement to obtain paternal consent did, in fact, prevent some women from
participation. Women who otherwise might have been eligible for inclusion in the study
were fearful that if paternal consent was sought they might risk domestic violence or
abandonment following notification to the partner that she was mv positive. Other
women believed that the potential father had not expressed any interest in the
pregnancy and had no right to decide whether she should participate in the clinical
study. Telephone interviews with researchers at Johns Hopkins University and the
University of ~land, 1994-95; see also Edward 1\L Connor et al., Reduction of
Maternal-Infant Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I with
Zidouudine Treatment, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1173 (1994) (describing the ACTG
076 trial and its results).
328. U.S. CONST. amend XIX. As with substantive due proce..~ analysis, state
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no constitutional right to health care, it is a benefit whose
distribution among similarly situated persons is constitutionally
governed. The exclusion of women of childbearing potential from
clinical research and other forms of health care is ''prima facie
disparate treatment of two classes of persons: [potentially] fertile
females and all others. "329 These exclusionary practices, then,
are subject to constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of equal
protection analysis, women occupy an intermediate status-historically disadvantaged, but not as disadvantaged as
those "protected" classes that have been discriminated against
because of race or illegitimacy. Policies and practices that have
the purpose or effect of discriminating against women are thus
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny; to withstand
constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds, "classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives."330 As the Supreme Court later articulated, the
government must have an "'exceedingly persuasive justification"'
for its disparate treatment of men and women. 331
The "important government objective" is the protection of the
mother and her fetus from injury. 332 In the case of the FDA,
exclusionary policies also are meant to promote consumer
protection through the safety and efficacy of drugs approved for
marketing. 333 The question, then, is whether the exclusion of all
women, or a particular subset of women, from clinical research
and certain other forms of health care is substantially related to

action is required. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("(A]ction inhibited
by . . . the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be
that of the states."). The NIH and FDA are state actors governed by the Constitution,
and their policies and regulations are subject to equal protection review. See Merton,
supra note 42, at 423-24 (maintaining that research supported by the NIH should
adhere to constitutional standards). In addition, the conduct of a private research or
health care organization may be considered state action by virtue of any close
regulation by and funding from federal, state, and local government. See, e.g., Golden,
supra note 295, at 1866.
329. Charo, supra note 261, at 149.
330. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
331. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (citations
omitted).
332. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 148 (predicting that
the government would argue that protecting potential life is an important government
objective).
333. See Ronald Podraza, The FDA's Response to AIDS: Paradigm Shift in New
Drug Policy?, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 356-57 (1993) ("The new drug approval
statutes and regulations have a dual purpose: (1) consumer protection, and (2)
enforcement of recognized scientific criteria in the conduct of studies performed for the
purpose of proving a drug's safety and effectiveness.").
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the government objectives of protection for women and their
fetuses and the marketing of safe, efficient drugs.
In the context of research, the FDA's 1977 Guidelines that
authorized the exclusion of women from early, if not all, phases
of drug trials could not meet the "substantially related" prong of
the test for constitutionality.334 Moreover, by authorizing the
exclusion of all women of childbearing potential from clinical
trials, the FDA, in effect, approved drugs for marketing to women
without any testing at all of the potential danger to women or
their fetuses. This is clearly in direct contradiction with and not
substantially related to the government's intention to protect
these populations.335 Fetal protection regulations that overlook
the role of male factors in causing fetal defects also do not
guarantee overall fetal well-being; there is evidence now that
birth defects may be transmitted via damaged sperm.336 In fact,
the "overinclusiveness" of Subpart B is also subject to equal
protection challenges because it singles out pregnant women for
exclusion from clinical research. 337
It has been argued, however, that discrimination based on
reproductive status is not gender discrimination per se. Rather,
the two classes of individuals distinguished for unequal treatment
are women who are capable of becoming pregnant and persons
who are not capable of becoming pregnant, a class that would
include some women as well as all men.338 This reasoning is
subject to question. A policy that distinguishes between these
groups is, on its face, gender neutral. To be upheld, such a policy
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government
interest unless it is found to be intentionally discriminatory. In

334. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 147 (arguing that the
exclusion of women of childbearing potential would violate the Equal Protection
Clause). Other discriminatory practices, such as the exclusion of all pregnant women
from substance abuse treatment programs, would require individualized determinations
of the sufficiency of the government actor's rationale for the practice. See Golden,
supra note 295, at 1869 ("The drug treatment programs' policies [that exclude pregnant
women] thus should be treated as a gender classification, subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny. A13 such, they should be held to violate the equal protection clause unless
they are substantially related to an important government interest...).
335. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 147. A great number
of drugs that are prescribed to women are tested only on women in the marketplace
when prescribed. See Merton, supra note 42, at 380-81 (describing women as ~guinea
pigs" when a new treatment hits the market). For drugs that are prescribed to
pregnant women, the lack of dosage studies prevents establishing minimal dosing
levels that would serve to limit harm to both women and fetuses. See id. at 385-86.
336. See Merton, supra note 42, at 392 n.107, 396 (discussing the failure of
policies to address male-medicated reproductive outcomes).
337. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 147.
338. See id. at 148 (analyzing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).
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Geduldig v. Aiello,339 the Supreme Court upheld a state's decision to exclude disabilities resulting from pregnancy from
coverage under the state's disability insurance program. 340
Reasoning that all classifications involving pregnancy do not
necessarily amount to classification based on gender for the
purpose of equal protection analysis,341 the Court applied the
rational basis standard of review and concluded that the state's
disability coverage policy was rationally related to several
legitimate interests.342
Geduldig can be distinguished from the proposition that
excluding women of childbearing potential from clinical research
is not gender discrimination. The underlying basis of the
Geduldig holding was the fact that the benefits that were
available under the disability insurance program were available
equally to men and women.343 Pregnant women received the
same coverage as nonpregnant persons. 344 In the context of clinical research, women of childbearing potential are not provided
the same benefits, including the opportunity to participate in
clinical trials and receive the provided therapies, as persons who
are not capable of becoming pregnant.
Equal protection may also apply to ''benign classifications,"
which favor one group over another, in order to remedy past
discrimination. 345 Arguably, then, the NIH Revitalization Act,
which requires the affirmative inclusion of women in clinical
studies, would constitute a benign classification. 346 If a man
challenged the constitutionality of this statute on grounds of
disparate treatment, the intermediate scrutiny test for application
to exclusion also would be applicable. 347 The success of such a
challenge might depend on whether the government could present

339. 417 u.s. 484 (1974).
340. See id. at 497.
341. See id. at 496 n.20 ("While it is true that only women can become pregnant
it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sexbased classification . . . .").
342. See id. at 496. The Court recognized the state's interest in maintaining the
self-supporting nature of its insurance program (it would have been very costly to
include pregnancy-related disability in its insurance scheme), distributing available resources so as to keep benefit payments at adequate levels for those disabilities that
were covered, and maintaining a contribution rate not unduly burdensome to
participating employees. See id. at 495-96. For a creative analysis of Geduldig, see
Golden supra note 292, at 1856-66 (arguing that Geduldig is consistent with
intermediate scrutiny).
343. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
344. Id.
345. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 149-50.
346. See id. at 150.
347. See id. at 147.
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evidence of past discrimination against women in clinical
research to justify the disparate treatment.348
C. Federal and State Antidiscrimination Statutes
Statutory protection against gender discrimination in
employment is set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.349
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which was made part
of Title VII, protects employed women who are pregnant.:l!o
Title VII protects against disparate treatment of men and women
and against practices that create disparate impacts on different
classifications of people.351
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court, in Johnson Controls,
held that a fetal protection policy that prevented fertile women
from certain employment opportunities violated Title VII and the
PDA352 First, the Court found the policy was gender-specific
because it applied only to the potential offspring of the female
employees "[d]espite evidence in the record about the debilitating
effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system."3!i3 This
practice of the differential application of privileges to men and
women constituted gender discrimination.3!>1 The Court also reasoned that despite potential risks to offspring, Title VII provided
that "[w]omen who are pregnant or potentially pregnant must be

348. See id. at 150.
349. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (1988).
350. Although Title vn explicitly prohibits sex discrimination, it did not originally
mention pregnancy discrimination, allowing the Supreme Court in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) to hold that certain pregnancy classifications did not
constitute gender discrimination. See id. at 139-40. In response, Congress passed the
PDA "to change the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to reflect the
commonsense view" that pregnancy discrimination is gender discrimination. HOUSE
COMM:. ON EDUC. &
PREGNANCY, H.R. REP.

LABOR,

PROHIBITION

OF SEX DISCRIMINATION BASED ON

No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). The PDA pro\ides,

in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but nre not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
351. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136-37 (describing that "a prima facie violation of
Title vn can be established in some circumstances upon proof that the effect of an
otherwise facially neutral plan or classification is to discriminate against members of
one class or another").
352. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991). Refer to subpart
IV(A) supra.

353.
354.

Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
See id. at 197.
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treated like others. "355
Because Title VII only applies in the employment context, its
legal application to clinical research and other health care may
be limited. 356 At least when a study uses paid participants, the
subjects' participation may be considered "employment," and
exclusionary practices in this context may be subject to Title VII
scrutiny. 357 In any case, the ethical and policy foundation
established by Johnson Controls is quite significant. 358
Gender discrimination in research also may be prohibited by
Title IX, which states that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."359 One commentator has argued that Title IX might
provide the basis for a sex discrimination claim by women excluded from clinical research conducted at educational institutions
receiving federal funds. 360
Recently, claims under federal antidiscrimination statutes,
including Title VII, are being raised in courts by women seeking
access to high-dose chemotherapy (HDCT) and autologous bone
marrow transplant (ABMT) for breast cancer. 361 It is alleged
that employers and group health insurers with whom they
contract discriminate by paying for HDCT/ABMT for some
cancers, but not for breast cancer. 362 On June 16, 1995, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an employer and its

355. !d. at 204.
356. See, e.g., Mary A. Bobinski, Women and HIV: A Gender-Based Analysis of a
Disease and Its Legal Regulation, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 7, 21-22 (1994) (considering
a claim in the context of women with HIV attempting to obtain access to research
trials). Refer to subpart IV(A) supra for a discussion of Johnson Controls, a Title VII
case.
357. See Merton, supra note 42, at 423 (suggesting that in "the rare circumstancen
where the subjects are paid, the participation could be considered a form of employment).
358. Refer to subpart IV(A) supra.
359. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
360. See Bobinski, supra note 356, at 22 n.55. "Potential research participants
excluded by reason of their gender might be entitled to relief under this provision, but
would have to establish that they are 'persons' protected from discrimination under the
Act and that their exclusion from research trials constituted 'discrimination.' n !d.
361. See Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1995)
(raising claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act for denial of health coverage
for HDCT); Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 870 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (charging that
denial of coverage for HDCT/ABMT for breast cancer violates the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Act). In addition, these claims charge violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993), and of various state
antidiscrimination laws that might prohibit sex discrimination or discrimination based
on disability. See Henderson, 70 F.3d at 959.
362. Henderson, 70 F.3d at 959; Reger, 836 F. Supp. at 871-72.
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health insurer could be required to pay for such treatments, even
though such coverage was excluded specifically under the terms
of the insurance policy.363 Without payment assurance, the
plaintiff was not able to enroll in a clinical trial that might have
afforded her the best chance of survival.364 Although this case,
and others like it, involve payment issues, they directly impact
women's access to research and treatment.355
Gender discrimination is not addressed in other federal laws
barring discrimination by recipients of federal funds, in public
facilities, or by places of public accommodation.:JSS However,
gender discrimination is regulated by state statutes prohibiting
discrimination in places of "public accommodation. "367 Public
accommodations might include facilities such as clinics, hospitals,
private doctors, and dentists. These laws potentially provide a
cause of action for women seeking access to clinical research and
treatment, with at least one court showing a willingness to
examine state antidiscrimination laws within the conteA"t of
women's health care services.
In Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases Northern General Hospital,
Inc., 368 pregnant women as a class were denied enrollment in
a hospital substance abuse program.369 The hospital defended
its policy based on the medical grounds that it lacked the
services of an obstetrician, and it was therefore not licensed to

363. See Henderson, 70 F.3d at 962. Currently, at least six states either have
passed or are considering legislation mandating that insurers offer coverage for
HDCT/ABMT treatment of delineated cancers, including breast cancer. See GA. CODE
.ANN. § 33-29-3.3 (Supp. 1995) (ABMT); :MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 47M (West
Supp. 1995) (ABMT); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 376.782, 376.1200 (Vernon Supp. 1996); N.H.
REv. STAT. .ANN. § 415:18-c (Supp. 1994) (ABZ..1T); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2·3418.1:1
(Michie 1994) <HDCT and ABMT); Health Insurance-Breast Cancer Treatment. H.F.
No. 1742, 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 62A.307).
Pursuant to the United States Office of Personnel Management and Policy (OPM}, all
health insurance plans provided to federal employees must offer such treatment for
breast cancer, as well as a number of other cancers, as a mandated benefit. Telephone
interview with OPM staff, July 1995.
364. See Henderson, 70 F.3d at 960.
365. It is unclear to what extent the provision of employee health benefits in this
context would fall within the reach of Title Vll. Furthermore, short of CA'Plicitly
excluding procedures for all women, it might be difficult to demonstrate disparate
impact.
366. See Bobinski, supra note 356, at 22 n.55.
367. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 1993) ("It shall be an
unlawful discriminatory practice for any ... owner ... or employee of any place of
public accommodation, ... to [refuse, withhold from, or deny] any of the accommoda·
tions, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place . . . to any person on
account of ... sex ....").
368. 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993).
369. See id. at 524.
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provide obstetrical care to the women. 370 The New York Court
of Appeals ruled that the hospital's use of a medical explanation
to exclude a class did not justify discrimination if the discriminatory behavior was based in fact on generalities surrounding the
medical condition.371 The court declared that any wholesale
exclusion of pregnant women must be medically warranted. 372
The facility had the burden to show that absolutely no pregnant
woman could be treated regardless of her health, stage of
pregnancy, or the severity of her addiction. 373 Alternatively, the
facility would have to demonstrate that it could not identify ''with
reasonable medical certainty" those women who would require
"immediate on-site obstetrical services" during their treatment for
substance abuse. 374
The New York court observed that "[m]any discriminatory
practices develop improperly because of a paternalistic sense of
what is 'best' for those who are discriminated against. "375 The
burden lies with medical facilities to show a medical basis for the
discriminatory practice. 376 A demonstration that some, or even
most, of the recipients should be denied access on medical
grounds is insufficient to deny the entire class of pregnant
women. 377 Therefore, distinctions based solely on a pregnant
condition constitute sex discrimination. 378 Consequently, state
antidiscrimination laws may potentially provide a basis for
protecting women's access to research and treatment in places of
public accommodation. 379

370. See id.
371. See id. at 524-25 (holding that distinctions based solely upon a woman's
pregnant condition constitutes sexual discrimination).
372. See id. at 524.
373. See id. at 525.
374. !d. at 525, 526.
375. Id. at 525-26.
376. See id. at 525.
377. See id. at 526.
378. See id. (stating that "'[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an
insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply'" (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart 435 U.S. 702, 708 ·
(1978) (alteration in original)).
379. One commentator suggests a contrary view:
[The Elaine W.] holding, while technically favorable for plaintiffs seeking to
challenge the exclusion of women from drug treatment centers, is nevertheless
quite limited. It provides no support for the argument that hospitals which
purport to provide drug treatment programs should make available the full
range of medical services that might be needed by program participants,
including obstetrical services.
Bobinski, supra note 356, at 23.
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D. Tort Liability
Medical researchers and pharmaceutical manufacturers share
a fear that if a woman participating in research becomes
pregnant and her fetus is harmed, they will be held liable.38
This fear is often the reason for the exclusion of women from
clinical trials, despite a very low reported incidence of research
injuries381 and few reported legal cases concerning such injuries.382 Fear of liability, however, has not operated to exclude
men from participating in clinical trials, despite evidence that
some fetal injury may be attributed to the father's e::-..-posure to
toxic substances.383 Ironically, fear of liability has never operated as a rationale for the inclusion of women in clinical research,
even though there may be more legal precedent for liability due
to exclusion.384
i)

1. Liability for Inclusion.
mt is impossible to quantify the risk of tort liability from the
inclusion of women in clinical studies at this time, because: (1)
there is no complete compendium of unreported cases involving
settlements and (2) pregnant women and women of childbearing
age have not been included in some major studies in the
past.385

Potential liability for injuries to women (and men) who
participate in clinical research is unlikely, provided that informed

See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 150.
381. See id. at 151. Nlli and the FDA do not require researchers or sponsors to
report research injuries. While no central registry of publicly or privately funded
research injuries exists, a 1975 survey of principal investigators indicates the incidence
of injury to be about 3.7%. ld. Less than 1~ of research participants suffered permanently disabling or fatal injuries. Id. The incidence of injury in this survey wns not
separated by gender or age. ld.
382. See id. Nlli has been involved in three legal actions in the last 20 years. See
id. One case brought against Nlli directly was dismissed, and the other two were tried
against Nlli grantee institutions. See id. at 170 n.5. Furthermore, the FDA has never
been sued for a clinical trial injury, and private firms have been involved only in
approximately two dozen reported cases. See id. at 151.
It is possible that legal recourse for research injuries is not sought in many
cases because of the fact that prior to enrollment in a clinical trial, the potential
participant is given a detailed description of the risks and benefits of the proposed
therapy, as well as their likelihood. See id. at 152. While enrolled in the trial,
participants receive not only the test therapy, but also a fairly high level of medical
care. See id. Participants may therefore feel that they have assumed the risks of
participating in the clinical trial and have no right to pursue a claim for injuries. See
id.
383. See id. at 150.
384. See id.
385. Id. at 12-13.
380.
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consent to participate in the research is obtained in accordance
with federal regulations and state tort law. 386 Federal regulations on disclosure may help to establish the standard of care in
a particular situation. 387 Even if a woman who has been injured
as a result of her participation in a clinical trial could prove the
necessary elements for recovery under a negligence theory,
researchers and manufacturers nonetheless may have defended
themselves from liability for her injuries by securing her
informed consent prior to participation in the trial. 388
Liability, then, turns on the "informed" nature of the
woman's consent to participate in the research-whether she has
been adequately warned of the potential risks of the research. 389
If the researcher has met the requisite standard of care by
warning the woman of the potential risks of the trial in which
she wishes to participate, and if she chooses to participate, it is
unlikely that she will succeed in any subsequent negligence
action for injuries that may occur as a result of her participation
in the trial.
Under strict liability principles, however, a defendant will be
held liable for injuries resulting from his or her unreasonably
dangerous activity. 390 In the context of clinical research, liability
may be found regardless of the woman's informed consent to
participate. 391 Providing adequate warning of the risks of the
386. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-.117 (delineating general requirements and documents
for informed consent). In the context of research, a battery action may be brought if
the participant is subjected to a study without her knowledge or consent. See 1
WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 153. If the initial consent to
participate did not include adequate disclosure of risks and alternatives, the legal
action will be based on negligence for lack of informed consent. See id. at 13, 153-54.
387. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH at 154, 156. In some states, the
standard of reasonable disclosure is defined as the customary practice of physicians;
other states use the prudent person standard where inquiry is made into what a
prudent person in these circumstances would want to know. See id. at 156.
388. See id. at 152, 155.
389. Federal regulations, as well as FDA guidelines, require researchers and IRBs
to obtain the informed consent of all persons who participate in clinical research. See
id. at 158-59. The standard for what constitutes informed consent varies from state
to state, but in general, three standards exist in the context of medical malpractice.
Some states allow a physician to disclose a level of information regarding risks and
benefits that is customary for physicians practicing in the community. See id. at 156.
Some states require physicians to disclose all information that a "prudent person" in
the patient's position would want to know. See id. In a few other states, a more
subjective standard has been adopted, requiring physicians to disclose all information
needed to allow the particular patient to make an informed decision. See id. at 156-57.
Recently, a federal court held that a higher standard for informed consent-a duty to
inform a potential participant of all "reasonably foreseeable" risks-is required for
participation in nontherapeutic research injury cases. See Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637
F. Supp. 1463, 1472 (M.D.N.C. 1986), a{fd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987).
390. See 1 WOJ\IEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 154.
391. See id.
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experimental therapy or drug, however, may insulate the
researcher or manufacturer from liability.392 Moreover, it is possible that strict liability principles do not apply to drug trials.3-<;J
Case law suggests that manufacturers of experimental drugs, as
well as providers of experimental medical services, may not be
held strictly liable for the effects of the drugs or services if the
participants in the clinical research have given legally sufficient
informed consent to participate and the trial is conducted appropriately.394
Questions of liability more often focus on potential harm to
the future offspring of women who participate in clinical
trials.395 It is unclear in this context whether obtaining the
informed consent of the mother would be sufficient to avoid
liability for the injury to the offspring. To date, there has been
virtually no case law establishing parameters for holding
researchers or drug manufacturers liable for injuries to the
offspring of clinical trial participants;396 however, liability can
be analyzed by looking to the purpose of the clinical trial in
which the mother participated.

392. See id.
393. See id. at 154-55 (noting that strict liability applies when a product is sold
in a defective, unreasonably unsafe condition). In a clinical trial, however, the manufacturer is not selling the drug to a participant. Id. Therefore, a participant who is
injured by an experimental drug may have no recourse against a manufacturer for her
injucy based on the theory of strict liability. See id. (citing Ellen Flannery & Sanford
N. Greenberg, Liability Exposure for Exclusion and Inclusion of Women as Subj'ects in
Clinical Studies, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3). This argument
is supported by comment k to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which protects a drug manufacturer from strict liability if a drug is "properly prepared and
marketed, and proper warning is given.• Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A.
comment k (1964). Comment k also applies this protection to e>.'Jlerimental drugs, in
particular, where, "because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical
experience, there can be no assurance of safety.• Id.
394. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that an experimental drug manufacturer was not strictly liable when the
warning was adequate, possible risks were outweighed by possible benefits to society,
and the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the dangerous activity}. It is interesting
to note, however, that the Gaston court first rejected the notion that strict liability
would not apply to drugs in the experimental phase because they were not sold. See
id. at 339; see also Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 1991}
(applying the medical services exemption to producers of blood products}.
395. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 159. "The child, if he
is born alive, is now permitted in every jurisdiction to maintain an action for the
consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies of such injuries after birth an action
will lie for his wrongful death." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
396. There have been only two cases of reported research injuries to offspring. See
1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 162. In both cases, the University
of Chicago was found liable because it had failed to obtain consent to C.'\'Jleriment \~ith
DES on pregnant women. See id. at 162 (analyzing Roberts v. Patel, 620 F. Supp. 323
(N.D. Ill. 1985) and Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978}}.
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The first, and fairly clear-cut, case would involve participation in a clinical trial where the treatment received was therapeutic for the fetus. In such a case, it is unlikely that liability
would be found when informed consent to the treatment was
provided to further the best interest of the fetus and improve its
health. 397
Some commentators have reasoned that the result would be
less clear if participation in the clinical trial was sought because
the experimental treatment or drug was designed to be therapeutic for the mother only. 398 In such a case, liability might rest on
an analysis of the seriousness of the mother's illness, the risks
to the fetus, and the existence of any safer alternatives. 399
When balancing these factors, however, the woman's health and
autonomy interests should not be subordinated to those of the
fetus. 400
Thus, it appears that when there is no negligence and the
appropriate informed consent to participation in a clinical trial
has been obtained, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that
researchers and sponsors will be held liable in tort for the
inclusion of women in their studies. 401 Furthermore, the possibility of tort liability seems "remote at best" when viewed in the
context of the Supreme Court's rejection in Johnson Controls of
the employer's fear of liability as a justification for its discriminatory fetal protection policy. In so holding, the Court reasoned that

397. See id. (citing Roberts and holding that a parent may consent for treatment
on the unborn fetus).
398. See, e.g., id. at 162-63.
399. See id. If the intervention is a benefit to the mother (but not for a serious
illness), or if there is a known risk to the fetus and there are safer treatment
alternatives, the risk of liability may be higher for the drug manufacturer or trial
sponsor. See id. at 163. There is also the rare possibility that a woman may wish to
participate in clinical research where the experimental treatment is not therapeutic for
her or her fetus. See id. Subpart B would virtually exclude most of this type of
research. See id.
400. See id. at 17 ("[P]regnant women should be treated as competent adults
capable of making their own decisions about participation in research."); see also In
re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. 1990) (holding that in virtually all cases the
question of what is to be done is to be decided by the patient on behalf of herself and
the fetus).
401. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 163-64. At least one
commentator has argued that there may be "settings in which third parties are not
entitled to rely on even the fully informed consent of prospective parents to immunize
them from later liability if the protocol poses very serious risks to the unborn child
while offering little benefit to the subject adult or to adults in general." See Ellen W.
Clayton, Liability Exposure When Offspring Are Injured Because of Their Parents'
Participation in Clinical Trials, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at
103, 107. On the other band, one could argue that because informed consent obtained
from the woman acts as an intervening cause in the injury to the offspring, there is
no legal precedent for holding a researcher liable. See Merton, supra note 42, at 407.
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"[i]f, under general tort principles, Title vn bans sex-specific
fetal-protection policies, the employer fully informs the woman of
the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the basis
for holding an employer liable seems remote at best.""'!)2
In his concurring opinion, Justice White observed that "it is
far from clear that compliance with Title vn will pre-empt state
tort liability."403 In response, the majority reasoned that the law
would not punish an employer who complied with Title VTI because "[w]hen it is impossible for an employer to comply with
both state and federal requirements, this Court has ruled that
federal law pre-empts that of the States.""'M It also maintained
that the increased cost of employing women of childbearing
potential, including the cost of liability insurance, could not
justify an exclusionary policy that discriminates on the basis of
gender.405 Based on this reasoning, Johnson Controls lends
support to the argument that the federal policy encouraging, if
not mandating, the inclusion of women in clinical research should
not be undermined based on the fear of tort liability by researchers, drug manufacturers, and other third parties. Furthermore,
even though Johnson Controls is an employment discrimination
case, it reinforces the importance of adequate informed consent
as a means of promoting the autonomy of women, as well as
men, and of reducing any likelihood of tort liability for the
inclusion of women in clinical research.

2. Liability for Exclusion. Liability for the exclusion of
women from clinical research may occur when a woman takes a
drug or receives a treatment that was untested in women during
the clinical trials. The evolution of public policy that establishes
the importance of including women in clinical research has
prompted commentators to suggest that researchers and drug
manufacturers should focus their concern on liability that results
from the exclusion of women from clinical research.4013 Unlike
speculation about liability for inclusion, legal precedent that has
based liability, in part, on the inadequate testing of a drug before
it was released into the market does exist.407 It is also possible
402. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 197, 208 (1991).
403. Id. at 213 (White, J., concurring).
404. Id. at 209 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963)).
405. See id. at 210.
406. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 13 (proposing that
liability concerns should not impede inclusion of women in clinical studies).
407. See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), modified on other grounds, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); West''· Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986};
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that a medical malpractice claim could result from the inappropriate application of a treatment regimen that was developed
through research in which only men were studied. Thus, in
contrast to liability for a research injury that results from being
included in research, liability for exclusion may result from the
lack of data necessary to establish appropriate standards for the
treatment of women.
Drug manufacturer liability may be found where physiological differences exist between men's and women's responses to a
particular drug, causation between the drug and the woman's
injury can be established, and the manufacturer fails to test the
drug on women. 408 If a woman who takes the drug has an
adverse reaction or if her future offspring is harmed, it would be
her exclusion from research, not her inclusion, that caused the
injury and that forms the basis for liability. Applying strict
liability principles, a defectively designed product may serve as
the basis for liability should an injury occur. A drug that has not
been adequately tested on women may be found to be defectively
designed, even if approved for marketing by the FDA. 409
The practice of "male-only" drug trials may also result in
liability for failure to warn, especially when there is evidence of
risk to women. 410 Under a negligence theory of product liability,
manufacturers have a duty to warn about not only known risks
of a drug, but also foreseeable risks that should have been
known. 411 If there had been evidence that the drug might be
unsafe for use in women (based on animal reproduction studies
or physiological gender differences) or if the manufacturer chose
not to perform studies that would ascertain the dangers that it
should have known, the manufacturer's failure to ascertain and
warn against these risks would support a product liability claim,
despite compliance with FDA standards. 412
For health care providers, liability resulting from exclusion

Taylor v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 362 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). These cases are discussed in 1 WOMEN
AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 166.
408. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 166.
409. See id. at 165-66 (citing Ellen Flannery & Sanford N. Greenberg, Liability
Exposure for Inclusion of Women as Subjects in Clinical Studies, in 2 WOMEN AND
HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 91) ("Manufacturers' liability results when, after
a drug is on the market, evidence emerges that the drug is more dangerous or less
effective in women."); see also Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 836
(Utah 1984) (noting that FDA standards and guidelines for testing are minimum standards).
410. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 167.
411. See id. at 165.
412. If the manufacturer deliberately failed to learn about such risks, it could also
be liable for punitive damages. See id.
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of women from drug trials and other clinical research may arise
in the form of medical malpractice claims. Such cases may be
based on the negligent prescription of drugs that were not tested
on women413 or the inappropriate medical treatment of women's
health conditions where there is no research data to support
efficacy or safety in women.'114 For example, at one time, women
had a ten-fold higher risk of dying in the hospital after undergoing coronary angioplasty, a procedure in which a tiny balloon
catheter is threaded into a blocked artery and then inflated, thus
flattening the blockage.415 The mortality difference eventually
was attributed to the smaller artery size of women, a factor that
was not considered when angioplasty was developed:us Now
that the machines have been scaled down and the inflatable
balloons used in women are smaller and more appropriate for
their artery size, it would be negligent for a physician to fail to
adapt angioplasty procedures to gender differences.
The promulgation of federal regulations and guidelines that
promote the inclusion of women in clinical research may both
raise the expectations of women for better health care and
provide evidence of a standard of health care that recognizes that
gender matters. As the standard of care develops to adapt drugs
and treatment to gender differences based on clinical research, a
physician's failure to adjust his or her clinical practice accordingly might be the basis for a malpractice action.

V.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

In September, 1992, the Office of Research on Women's
Health (ORWH) of the National Institutes of Health, commissioned the Institute of Medicine to establish a Committee on the
Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in

413.
414.

See id.
See id. at 166-67. Medical malpractice may also result from misdiagnosis of

conditions whose manifestations in women have not been adequately studied or, as a
result of gender bias and communication barriers, have not been seriously considered.
One clear example of this is ignoring heart attacks in women. When a 42 year old
smoker went to a local clinic complaining of chest pains that she had experienced on
and off for a year, she was told she probably had gallstones. See LAURENCE &
WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 85. When the pain got worse, she returned to the clinic
where, despite the fact that her father and two uncles had died of heart attacks when
young, the original diagnosis was affirmed. See id. She went home, collapsed from
chest pain, and nearly died from a massive heart attack. See id. 'When she was
appropriately diagnosed at a larger teaching hospital, cardiologists wondered why no
one in the local clinic recognized heart disease in a heavy smoker \',ith chest pain and
a family history of death from heart attack. See id.
415. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 104, 105.
416. See id. at 105.
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Clinical Studies. 417 The Committee was charged with examining
the ethical and legal implications of policies that would broaden
inclusion of women in clinical trials, including pregnant women
and women of childbearing potential.418 The Committee's recommendations were finalized after passage of the NIH Revitalization
Act but prior to publication of the 1994 Nffi Guidelines. Much of
the Committee's recommendations are still being integrated to
varying degrees in NIH policy. Thus, it is important to highlight
the most significant social, legal, and ethical considerations that
formed the basis for the Committee's recommendations and that
are critical to our moving forward in this area. These considerations will be integrated into a discussion of broader policy issues
and strategies that address gender bias in all aspects of health
care.

A.

Justice

The ethical principle of justice is not achieved when the
national research agenda does not address women's health issues
and when women are subject to treatments that have not been
adequately tested on their gender. Toward this goal, the Women's
Health Initiative (WHI), the largest U.S. preventive study of its
kind, has been established to examine the major causes of and
treatments for cardiovascular disease, cancer, and osteoporosis in
postmenopausal women. 419 Although it demonstrates NIH's
commitment to expanding our knowledge of important women's
health issues, the WHI is but one step in achieving justice in our
national research agenda.
Where there has not been a fair allocation of research,
attention, or resources, "justice may require a policy of preferential treatment . . . in order to remedy a past injustice."420 Our

417. See id. at vi.
418. See id. The recommendations of the Committee are set out in WOMEN IN
HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3. It is from participation as a member of this
Committee that the author endorses the policy recommendations on clinical research.
For a listing of the other members of the Committee, see id. at iii, iv.
419. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, OVERVIEW STATEMENT ON
WOMEN'S HEALTH INITIATIVE (1995). The WHI has three major components: "a
randomized controlled clinical trial of promising but unproven approaches to
prevention; an observational study to identify predictors of disease; and a study of
community approaches to developing healthful behaviors." Id. at 1. The trial will enroll
approximately 64,500 postmenopausal women 50-79 years of age and will require a 15
year time frame and an investment of $628 million. See id. at 1-2.
420. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 5. Furthermore,
"[w]omen and men should be enrolled as participants in clinical studies in a manner
that ensures that research yields scientifically generalizable results applicable to both
genders." ld.
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enthusiasm for including women and minorities in clinical studies
should not mean, however, that these groups now get targeted for
coercive activity. Because of the requirements of the Nlli
Revitalization Act, researchers may feel pressured to recruit and
retain participants aggressively from the same groups that
historically had been subject to abuse and e:l\.-ploitation."21
Voluntariness and informed consent must protect subjects from
unethical and coercive treatment. 422 Thus, the Committee
recommended that, in designing recruitment and consent
procedures, principal investigators must be sensitive to the concerns and needs of those groups that have had a history of exploitation or abuse in prior human experimentation.''23

B. Consistency in Federal Regulations: Presumption of Inclusion
Although recent changes in relevant federal policies appear
to promote inclusion rather than exclusion, there still remains
confusion about the extent to which women of childbearing
potential, and particularly pregnant women, are to be included
or excluded in clinical research. The Nlli and FDA differ in their
goals and definitions of clinical trials and research; thus it is
important that, wherever possible, federal agencies establish
consistent policies in order to avoid regulatory paralysis.''2'
More specifically, based on an analysis of ethical principles,
current statutory and constitutional principles, and the current
state of liability concerns, federal policy should assure that both
women and men of reproductive age are not excluded by
investigators and IRBs from participating in clinical studies:'~
"[T]he potential or prospect of becoming pregnant during [a]
study may not be used as a justification for precluding or
limiting participation" of women of reproductive age.42a This
recommendation is based on the principle of respect for persons,
as well as a recognition that both men and women must evaluate
risks to their reproductive system in the same manner as risks
to other organ systems.427 Through the use of the informed
consent process, both men and women can evaluate the risks to
reproduction and potential offspring:'28
421. See id. at 9-10.
422. See id. at 10.
423. See id.
424. See id. at 11.
425. See id. at 12.
426. Id. at 15.
427. See id.
428. See id. The Committee further recommended thnt "the participant be
permitted to select voluntarily the contraceptive method of his or her choice .,.;here
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Special Considerations for Pregnant Women

Because of significant gaps in knowledge with respect to the
treatment of pregnant women, NIH must strongly encourage and
facilitate clinical research to advance the treatment of preexisting medical conditions in women who become pregnant,
medical conditions of pregnancy, and conditions that threaten
successful course of pregnancy. 429 Consequently, pregnant
women should be presumed eligible for participation in clinical
studies. 430 Thus, the Committee advocates that "[e]ven when
evidence concerning risks is unknown or ambiguous, the decision
about acceptability of risk to the pregnancy or to offspring should
be made by the woman as part of the informed consent process."431
It is important to note that presuming pregnant women are
eligible is not the equivalent of advocating their active
recruitment for each clinical study. There may be valid scientific
and medical reasons for excluding pregnant women from a
certain clinical study. 432 After much debate and discussion, most
Committee members ultimately endorsed the following recommendations:
Investigators and IRBs may exclude pregnant women from
participation only when the IRB finds, and records its finding
in writing, that the following standard has been met: (1) there
is no prospect of medical benefit to the pregnant woman, and
(2) a risk of significant harm to potential offspring is known or
can be plausibly inferred. 433

Under this standard, it is expected that an IRB might "exclude
pregnant women from the earliest phases of some drug trials, but
[that] most clinical studies would remain open to pregnant
women."434
there are no relevant study-dependent scientific reasons for excluding certain contraceptives . . . . [P]regnancy termination options [should also] be discussed as part of tho
consent process in clinical studies that pose unknown or foreseeable risks to potential
offspring." Id.
429. See id. at 16.
430. See id. at 17. Furthermore, women who are lactating should not be excluded
from clinical studies, but the informed consent process should incorporate discussion
of any special risks to children. See id. at 15.
431. Id. at 17.
432. See id. The Committee cites the example of a pregnant woman being excluded
from a contraception study on a hormone replacement study. See id.
433. Id. at 18. A finding that trial participation may risk significant harm may
be based on evidence from animal studies, in vitro studies, structure-activity
relationship data, or previous clinical experience. Id.
434. Id. It is worth noting that a few of my colleagues on the Committee believed
that we should accommodate the conscience of individual investigators who believe that
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The principles of respect for persons, justice, and the need for
scientific knowledge support the presumption of inclusion, yet
existing DHHS regulations relating to pregnant women codify the
presumption of exclusion: "'no pregnant woman may be a
research subject' except under certain conditions. JH3!j When the
regulations classify pregnant women as "vulnerable to coercion or
undo influence,"436 it suggests that they are less autonomous or
more easily exploited by virtue of their pregnancy.'137 Subpart
B of the DHHS regulations for the protection of human subjects
should be repealed or significantly revised to reflect the
presumption that pregnant women are as competent as nonpregnant persons to weigh the risks and benefits of participation in
an approved clinical study.438 To assure the adequacy of information about the risks and benefits to a woman's pregnancy and
potential offspring, strengthened informed consent procedures
might include special disclosure statements.''39
Furthermore, in recognition of a woman's autonomous
decisionmaking and concern for constitutional and ethical
principles, the provisions of Subpart B that permit a paternal
veto to a pregnant woman's participation in clinical research
should be also eliminated.440 In the best of all worlds, a pregnant woman should be encouraged to discuss her participation in
a clinical trial with the potential offspring's father. 441 Yet

pregnant women should be e.xcluded from a clinical trial. See id. Howe\'er, such a "conscience clause" could be abused significantly and serve indirectly to e.xclude all
pregnant women. See id. Such potential abuse, for example, has been e."qlerienced in
the context of most health care providers refusing to do abortions. See, e.g., Amy
Goldstein, U.S. Abortion Seruices Drop, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at A1 (reporting
that more than 500 U.S. hospitals and clinics have stopped providing abortions since
the 1980s}.
435. Id. at 16 (referring to 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(a)}.
436. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b}.
437. See id. Although pregnant women, and more specifically their fetuses, may
be considered "vulnerable" in the sense of being susceptible to serious injury, the
regulation focuses upon vulnerability in the context of limited decisionmaking capacity.
By grouping pregnant women with children, prisoners, mentally disabled persons, and
other disadvantaged persons in need of additional protection, it suggests a state of
diminished capacity or distrust of their judgment during pregnancy that is misleading
and inappropriate.
438. Moreover, the reference to pregnant women as a "vulnerable populationO" in
Subpart A, codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3), should also be eliminated.
439. The Committee suggested that the disclosure statement might include: "If you
are pregnant or contemplating pregnancy, we urge you to consult your obstetrical care
provider before deciding about participation in this study. Participation in this study
may (does) pose a risk of (significant} harm to your pregnancy and/or your potential
baby." 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 196 (emphasis removed).
440. See id. at 197. Refer to subpart ill(B)(1) supra.
441. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 197 (recognizing that
the father may have a strong emotional attachment to his unborn child).
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women, not investigators or the state, are in the best position to
determine whether to consult with the future father. To have the
power to veto the participation in research gives men unreasonable control over a woman's bodily integrity and medical
decisionmaking authority. 442 In fact, it is inconsistent that once
a child is born, federal regulations require, under certain
circumstances, only one parent's permission to enroll a child in
clinical research. 443
Until Subpart B is amended, we will continue to face mixed
messages from the regulatory arena. Special rules for pregnant
women as vulnerable often get carried over into special rules for
all women of childbearing potential. Ironically, this would
undermine our very attempts to expand the numbers of women
in clinical studies. More importantly, we must also recognize that
such an inference that pregnant women are less autonomous will
perpetuate gender bias in other areas of health care. To date, the
new NIH Guidelines are silent with respect to special rules for
pregnant women. To further complicate the regulatory landscape,
the FDA has yet to establish guidelines on including pregnant
women in drug trials. 444

D. Addressing Gender Bias
Gender bias in clinical research must be placed in its social
and ethical context. Two forms of gender bias may impact on the
design and conduct of clinical studies: male bias (adopting a male
perspective) and the male norm (the tendency to use males as
the standard and females as problematic).445 These biases, in
turn, are further perpetuated in the delivery of women's health
care.
Unconscious biases may permeate the entire scientific
research process, influencing the research topics selected, the
concepts examined, the study design, and the research participants chosen for inclusion. 446 Clearly, one way to address
such gender biases may be to increase the numbers of women
scientists active in clinical research. Toward this goal, one of the

442. See id.
443. See id.
444. The CDC Policy, refer to note 233 supra, however, does provide that
"[i]nformation on adverse differences in outcome or risk profiles for pregnant women
may be reason for exclusion." 60 Fed. Reg. 47,949. It further states that "pregnancy
status may need to be determined prior to enrollment for some studies and, if
necessary, during an intervention to safeguard the participants' health." Id.
445. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 8.
446. See id.
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major priorities of the Office of Research on Women's Health
(ORWH) is to foster the recruitment and promotion of women in
biomedical careers.447
In addition to increasing the number of women in biomedical
careers, the ORWH, in collaboration with other governmental
agencies and women's health and professional organizations, is
examining "the appropriate integration" of women's health issues
into medical school curricula.448 Health care professionals not
only need to understand basic female physiology and reproductive
biology, but also must understand aspects of disease that differ
in women. Just as significantly, the goal of medical education
should be to create "an understanding of how medicine has
historically perpetuated sex-role stereotypes in definitions of
health, illness and normality, through research and clinical practice.n449 Thus, if physicians are going to be competent to
comprehensively address women's health needs, they must be
able to adopt attitudes and behaviors that are culturally"co and
gender sensitive, including an appreciation of gender differences
in communication, interaction, and clinical decisionmaking."51
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, society must trust women to make decisions
about their own health and a healthy future with their families.
Gender bias in clinical research has left us with a large amount
of incomplete or meaningless information on how best to address
women's health needs. It has left pregnant women and their
physicians totally in the dark. The common label that appears on

447. See generally OFFICE OF REsEARCH ON WOMEN'S HEALTH, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, WOMEN IN BIOMEDICAL CAREERS (1992). Issues covered include:
recruiting women in biomedical careers, role of models and mentors, career paths and
rewards, reentry into a biomedical career, family responsibilities, research initiatives
on women's health, gender sensitivity, and minority women and science. See id. at 813.
448. See HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 156, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 81 (1993); see also SENATE APPROPRIATIONS Cor.w., S. REP. No. 397, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 143 (1992). S. 1569 would have established an Office of Women's Health to
work with other governmental health agencies to advance research on women's health,
facilitate the employment of women as scientists, and expand medical school curriculum on women's health. See S. REP. No. 397, supra, at 49-50.
449. Susan Phillips, The Social Context of Women's Health: Goals and Objectiues
for Medical Education, 152 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 507, 509 (1995).
450. Health care providers must be particularly attentive to how women's health
needs reflect differences in race, class, ethnicity, culture, se.'CUal orientation, and socioeconomic status. See id. at 510.
451. See COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUC., FIFTH REPORT: WOMEN AND
MEDICINE 23 (1995) (advocating a "new paradigm" to improve health care, including
attention to prevention, community approaches, and education).
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all drugs is symbolic: "'It is also not known whether [this drug]
can cause fetal harm when administered to a pregnant woman
or can affect reproduction capacity. [This drug] should be given
to a pregnant woman only if clearly needed.' "452 It is more than
a warning for pregnant women and their physicians; rather it is
a warning to all of us that if we do not presume that all women
can be trusted to make decisions about clinical research and
health care, we will never eradicate gender bias.

452.

21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(6)(i)(c).
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